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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The concept of state intervention in the economy can be traced back to ancient 
civilizations.
1
 Be that as it may, the great depression and the Second World War, among 
others, amplified the role of the state in the economy and led to the growth of national 
companies or State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in sectors, such as energy.
2
Proponents of 
state intervention mainly locate their arguments in favour of the practice, in potential 
market failure and regulation failure.
3
 
 
A basic examination of the term ‗market economy’ is important for the understanding of 
state intervention and market failure. The term refers to an economic system where 
market forces of demand and supply guide economic decisions in a country.
4
 Countries 
that have market economies rarely engage in state intervention, although they may allow 
state intervention in certain sectors of the economy.
5
 An open or mixed economy, though 
related to the market economy, is a combination of both planned
6
 and market economies.
7
 
                                                 
1
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance of State Owned 
Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries (2005) 20 (Hereafter cited as Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development 2005) The author is of the opinion that the term ancient civilizations is an 
ambiguous phrase and does not sufficiently locate the origin of state intervention. 
2
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
3
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 See also The World Bank 
‗Overview of the Political and Economic Arguments in Favor of and Against the Establishment of a NOC‘ 
(2009) 6 (Working Draft of Chapter 2 of the Study on National Oil Companies and Value Creation) 
(Hereafter cited as The World Bank 2009) Regulation failure may be overcome by state intervention where 
the state does not have the capacity to regulate efficiently among others. The term ‗regulation failure’ is 
self explanatory and refers to the government failing to regulate the market.  
4
 Market Economy accessed at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketeconomy.asp (accessed on 2 
May 2011) and http://www.economywatch.com/market-economy (accessed on 2 May 2011) 
5
 Market Economy accessed at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketeconomy.asp (accessed on 2 
May 2011) and http://www.economywatch.com/market-economy (accessed on 2 May 2011) This definition 
of market economies shows that state intervention happens in a market economy. The state intervenes in a 
market economy, when there is reason to do so. 
6
 In a planned economy, the government decides what is to be produced and the prices of the different 
commodities. It is the opposite of the market economy. See http://www.economywatch.com/market-
economy (accessed on 2 May 2011) 
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The above discussion indicates that there is a distinction between planned economies and 
state intervention. While both concepts allow the state to participate in guiding the 
economy, they differ on the degree of state participation. Planned economies allow 
greater state participation as compared to state intervention under a market economy. 
 
Market failure occurs in the absence of efficient markets.
8
 Efficient markets are defined 
as markets where resources are allocated perfectly, that is, everyone has access to full 
information and equal opportunity to bid.
9
 Efficient markets also refer to instances where 
there are no external forces acting to influence the outcome in the markets.
10
 The 
existence of efficient or perfect markets is debatable.
11
 Economists argue that the concept 
of efficient and perfect markets is merely idealist and only relevant in the development of 
economic models.
12
 Despite the existence of such opinions, the idea of efficient markets 
is relevant in the practical assessment of the effectiveness of markets. It can be deduced 
from the above definition, that efficient markets are very rare, thus market failure occurs 
in many economies. This makes state intervention necessary in very many market 
economies. 
 
Market failure may exist in natural monopolies, which arise due to large economies of 
scale and costs in this instance can only be reduced if output is supplied by a single 
monopolistic producer, for example, electricity and gas sectors.
13
 Market failure may also 
exist in public goods, for example law and order, where consumption and payments are 
de-linked, as everyone benefits from the services.
14
 Lastly, market failure may exist in 
merit goods which can be restricted to particular groups, but consumption is desirable 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 See http://www.economywatch.com/market-economy (accessed on 2 May 2011) 
8
 Katz A W Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law (1998) 39-40 (Hereafter cited as Katz A W 
1998 )  
9
 Katz A W (1998) 39-40 
10
 Katz A W (1998) 40 
11
 Perfect markets imply efficient markets, although efficient markets do not always imply perfect markets. 
Nevertheless, there is a correlation between the two terms. See University of Hull Business School 
‗Efficient Markets Hypothesis‘ (2002/2003) 6 at http://www.e-m-h.org/FM08.pdf (accessed on 12 April 
2011) 
12
 Chun L ‗Challenging Privatization: A Conceptual and Theoretical Argument‘ (2009) Journal of Chinese 
Political Science 2009 14: 23 (Hereafter cited as Chun L 2009) 
13
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
14
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
even if consumers cannot pay a market price, for example health and education.
15
 Thus in 
such circumstances, the state will intervene to control these market imperfections. 
 
Related to the foregoing discussion, in April 1965, the Norwegian government passed a 
Royal Decree to lay down basic guidelines for Norway‘s administration of oil and gas.16 
The said Decree laid the foundation for the widely admired Norwegian Model of 
administration of oil as a natural resource.
17
 In 1972, the Norwegian State Oil Company 
was formed.
18
 The government also established the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and 
later created the Ministry of Petroleum and Industry in 1978.
19
  
 
In contrast to the above developments in Norway, Denmark had relied on individuals and 
private companies to develop its oil and gas industry.
20
 In 1948, a committee set up to 
investigate allegations of fraud regarding oil discoveries in Denmark by Frederic Ravlin, 
found that the discoveries were a sham and that Ravlin had committed fraud against the 
state.
21
 Later in 1962, Denmark transferred all its oil and gas exploration rights to the 
Danish ship builder A P Møller, Gulf and Shell.
22
 The concession attracted a lot of 
controversy in addition to the high oil prices that characterised the 1970s and the 1980s.
23
 
The oil and gas industry in Norway thus developed against the backdrop of the 
unfortunate Danish experience, induced by private players as discussed above. 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
16
 Thurber M and Istad T B ‗Norway‘s Evolving Champion: Statoil and the Politics of State Enterprise.‘ 
(2010) Working Paper 92, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development 11 (Hereafter cited as Thurber 
M and Istad T B 2010) See also Norway‘s Economy https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/no.html (accessed on 2 May 2011) The Norwegian Economy is a welfare capitalist economy, 
featuring free market activity and state intervention. 
17
 Thurber M and Istad T B (2010) 5 
18
 Thurber M and Istad T B (2010) 15 
19
 Thurber M and Istad T B (2010) 15 
20
 Hahn-Pedersen M A P Møller and the Danish Oil (1999) 22 (Hereafter cited as Hahn-Pedersen M 1999) 
21
 Hahn-Pedersen M (1999) 22 
22
 Hahn-Pedersen M (1999) 52 
23
 Hahn-Pedersen M et al A P Møller and the Danish Oil (1999) cited by Thurber M and Istad T B (2010) 
11 
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Subsequently, countries, especially those that have not fully realised the economic 
benefits of their oil sector,
24
 or those
25
 that have recently discovered commercially viable 
deposits of oil, are now considering the Norwegian model for management of oil as a 
natural resource. The aforementioned model envisages administration of oil resources 
using three government entities: a NOC engaged in commercial operations; a government 
ministry to establish policy; and a regulatory body to perform the regulatory and 
technical advisory role.
26
 
 
Uganda has recently discovered reasonably large deposits of oil
27
 and is moving towards 
the above described trend. The Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and 
Value Addition) Bill 2010 (the Petroleum Bill 2010); provides for the creation of a 
NOC
28
 and the Petroleum Authority of Uganda.
29
 It is worth noting that in addition to the 
above institutions, the Ministry of Energy and Mineral development is maintained, thus 
creating a tripartite framework similar to that in the Norwegian Model. The above 
structure is a departure from the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 7 of 1985, 
where most functions are vested in the minister responsible for petroleum exploration and 
production and the commissioner for petroleum exploration and production. The 
Norwegian State Oil Company which has successfully managed Norwegian oil and gas 
this far, provides an example upon which the proposed Ugandan NOC can be structured. 
 
                                                 
24
 Thurber M et al ‗The Limits of Institutional Design in Oil Sector Governance: Exporting the Norwegian 
Model‘ (2010) ISA Annual Convention, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development 5 (Hereafter 
cited as Thurber M et al 2010) 
25
 Ghana and Uganda are examples of countries towing this line. ‗Norway Helps Ghana Prepare for the Oil 
Age‘See:http://www.embnorway.com.ng/News_and_events/development/Norway_Ghana_oil_cooperation/ 
(accessed on 11 April 2011) Reporting on Norwegian and Ghanaian co-operation. See also the Petroleum 
(Exploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill 2010 of Uganda. 
26
 Thurber M et al (2010) 7 
27
 The oil reserves in Uganda are estimated at 2 billion barrels as quoted by Reuters, Bagh C ‗Uganda‘s Oil 
Industry‘. See: 
 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/03/27/uganda-oil-investments-idUKLDE62N1I820100327 (accessed on 
24 August 2010)  
28
 The Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill 2010 clause 42  
29
 The Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill 2010 clause 9 
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The international forum has taken cognisance of the success of the Norwegian model. 
The draft Natural Resources Charter
30
 details best practices in management of natural 
resources. The best practices indicated are quite similar to the structure of the Norwegian 
model. It should be noted however that this Charter is intended to guide countries and has 
no legal effect. 
 
NOCs developed during the era of increased state intervention in national 
economies.
31
NOCs may be classified under the overarching category of SOEs. David 
Robinett has described SOEs to include a diverse range of corporations:  
 
State-owned enterprises—sometimes also referred to as government corporations, 
government-linked companies, parastatals, public enterprises, or public sector 
enterprises—are a diverse mix ranging from internationally competitive listed companies, 
large-scale public service providers, wholly owned manufacturing and financial firms, to 
small and medium enterprises.
32
  
 
This definition of SOEs is very broad and it envisages both fully owned and partially 
owned enterprises. Entities, such as, public enterprises and government linked companies 
are partially owned by the state, with other shareholders holding shares. The term ‗State 
Owned Enterprises‘ thus generally refers to all these entities whether fully or partially 
owned by the state. 
 
Paul Stevens defines an NOC as: 
 
                                                 
30
 The draft charter has been written by an independent Group of experts comprising of economists, 
lawyers and political scientists. 
31
 Wainberg M F et al ‗Commercial Frameworks for National Oil Companies‘ (2007) Working Paper, 
Center for Energy Economics 4 (Hereafter cited as Wainberg M F et al 2007) See also Stevens P ‗National 
Oil Companies: Good or Bad? - A Literature Survey‘ (2003) National Oil Companies workshop 
presentation, World Bank 1 (Hereafter cited as Stevens P 2003) A big number of NOCs were established in 
the 25 years that followed the end of the Second World War  
32
 Robinett D ‗Held By The Invisible Hand, The Challenge of SOE Corporate Governance for Emerging 
Markets‘ (2006) The World Bank Corporate Governance Department 1 (Hereafter cited as Robinett D 
2006) at http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Other/CorpGovSOEs.pdf (accessed on 20 November 2011) 
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An oil company operating in some part of the oil value chain owned and controlled by 
government.
33
  
 
He further observes that NOCs set up by oil importing countries and those set up by oil 
exporting countries should be distinguished.
34
 However, the above definition is narrow 
and does not make the distinction between those partially owned NOCs and those fully 
owned by the government. This research focuses on NOCs set up by oil exporting 
countries, both fully and partially owned by the government. 
 
Research conducted in 2005 indicates that at the time 9 of the top 10 oil companies in 
terms of oil reserves were NOCs and all 10 of the top 10 companies in terms of natural 
gas were NOCs.
35
 It further shows that these NOCs were mainly located in developing 
countries.
36
 The above statistics, though not conclusive, point to NOCs being the 
preferred entities in dealing with national oil resources. 
 
Discussing the involvement of OECD countries in the oil sector, Paul Stevens
37
 notes that 
the involvement of governments was mainly driven by the view that they should address 
social and economic problems. He further notes that the existence of market failure 
required state intervention.
38
  
 
During the 1970s and 1980s state intervention was strongly criticized, translating into 
partial or full privatization of several NOCs during the 1990s and the early 21
st
 century.
39
 
Central to the debate and criticism of NOCs at the time, was the lack of competition and 
transparency which resulted in inefficiency, corruption and incompetence.
40
 
 
                                                 
33
 Stevens P (2003) 5 
34
 Stevens P (2003) 5 
35Petroleum Intelligence Weekly ‗Ranking the World‘s Oil Companies‘ (2005) See: 
 http://www.energyintel.com/PublicationHomePage.asp?publication_id=4 (accessed on 4
 
January 2011) 
36
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 2 
37
 Stevens P (2003) 1 
38
 Stevens P (2003) 2 
39
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 6 
40
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 6 
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Paul Stevens notes that market forces, though supported by several critics of state 
intervention, may not be the solution.
41
 Currently, resource ‗nationalism‘, including the 
re-emergence of NOCs, justifies the foregoing statement to a large extent.
42
 The re-
emergence of NOCs is attributed to several factors; though the rise in oil and gas prices 
coupled with the fact that NOCs are still perceived as contributing greatly to economic 
development appear to strongly favour the reemergence of NOCs.
43
 Additionally, the fact 
that oil revenue is a tool for political control cannot be understated and this may be 
another reason for the re-emergence of NOCs.
44
 
 
Despite the challenges that many NOCs faced in the 1970s and the 1980s, these 
institutions remain relevant.
45
 However, the fact that in many African countries, the 
commercial space is rife with political interference and corruption; stands to undermine 
the relevance of SOEs and NOCs.
46
 Research indicates that good governance of NOCs is 
a must have, at both the public sector level and the corporate level.
47
 It is only through 
good governance, at both the public sector level and the corporate level, that the evils of 
corruption, inefficiency and incompetence, which besieged state intervention and NOCs, 
during the 1970s and 1980s,
48
 will be expunged.  
 
Though NOCs may be difficult to manage in Africa, they are a key ingredient of the 
Norwegian Model. Moving forward, it is necessary to insulate these companies from poor 
corporate practices and guide them in ensuring maximization of resources to attain their 
full potential. Central to this objective is the concept of corporate governance in NOCs.
49
  
 
                                                 
41
 Stevens P (2003) 4 
42
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 9-10 
43
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 9 
44
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 9 
45
 See Section 2.4 of the thesis on the relevance of NOCs. 
46
 Goldsmith A ‗Perceptions of Business and Governance in Africa: A survey of Eight Countries‘ (2001) 
African Economic Policy Discussion paper number 82 12 (Hereafter cited as Goldsmith A 2001) at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACM787.pdf (accessed on 3 March 2011) 
47
 Foss M, Wainberg M F ‗CEE‘s Research on National Oil Companies‘ (2008) Research Note, Centre for 
Energy Economics 4 (Hereafter cited as Foss M, Wainberg M F 2008) 
48
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 6 
49
 Foss M, Wainberg M F (2008) 4 
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Several definitions of corporate governance have been advanced; however, this study will 
focus on those definitions which touch on the regulation of SOEs, in particular NOCs. 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury has defined corporate governance as the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled.
50
 Later in 2000, he expanded on the above definition, he 
stated that: 
 
Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individual and communal goals. The corporate governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society.
51
  
 
The above definition has been adapted for this discussion as it fits in with the role of 
SOEs and NOCs which usually have commercial and social functions. 
 
Special attention is drawn to the stakeholder theory
52
 in the analysis of corporate 
governance theories relevant to NOCs. The stakeholder theory is wide, involving all 
stakeholders in the NOC and not limited to the shareholder-director relationship espoused 
by the agency and stewardship theories which may not consider the unique structure of 
SOEs and NOCs.
53
 The discourse on corporate governance is guided by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of Corporate 
Governance
54
 and the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State Owned 
Enterprises, 
55
among others. 
                                                 
50
 The Committee on Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Report of the Committee on Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (1992) 14 (Hereafter cited as the Committee on Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance 1992) 
51
Cadbury A ‗Global Corporate Governance Forum‘ (2000) World Bank accessed at 
 http://www.corpgov.net/library/definitions.html (accessed on 2 February 2011) 
52
Wicaksono A ‗Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: Investment Holding Structure of 
Government-linked Companies in Singapore and Malaysia and Applicability for Indonesian State-Owned 
Enterprises‘ (2008) unpublished PhD thesis, University of St Gallen 24 (Hereafter cited as Wicaksono A 
2008) 
53
 Wicaksono A (2008) 18- 26 
54
 2004 
55
 2005 
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Presently, the corporate governance regime in Uganda is mainly limited to financial 
institutions and listed companies.
56
 The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda 
Guidelines
57
 are also in existence although these are not legally binding. Efforts have 
been made to include corporate governance provisions in the Companies Bill 2009,
58
 
which is currently before Parliament. The Companies Bill 2009 provides for a Code of 
Corporate Governance in the Second Schedule under Table F. It should be noted that 
section 14 of the Companies Bill makes the application of the Code optional for private 
companies and allows public companies to select particular provisions that will apply to 
them.  
 
Related to the foregoing, section 42 of the Petroleum Bill 2010, establishes the National 
Oil Company of Uganda. The Company is to be established under the Companies Act of 
Uganda. Section 42(1) of the Act provides as follows: 
 
There shall be incorporated, under the Companies Act, a National Oil Company to 
manage, on behalf of the State, the commercial aspects of petroleum activities and the 
participating interests of the State in the licences. 
 
The Petroleum Bill 2010 has no provisions on corporate governance and does not make 
any reference to corporate governance. Reference to the Companies Act, in the Petroleum 
Bill 2010, is a futile attempt at covering up this anomaly. The Companies Act Cap 110 
doesn‘t have a Corporate Governance Code. However, it is up for amendment and will 
soon be replaced by the Companies Bill 2009, which provides for a Code of Corporate 
Governance. This Code is not tailor-made for the unique oil and gas industry or SOEs 
with numerous stakeholders. The Petroleum Activities Act 29
59
 of Norway does provide 
                                                 
56
 The Financial Institutions Act 2004 and the Capital Markets Authority (Corporate Governance 
Guidelines) 2003 
57
 See http://www.icgu.or.ug/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=35&Itemid=79 (accessed on 
18 September 2010) 
58
 The Companies Bill 2009 section 14 
59
 Petroleum Activities Act 29 Section 11-2 to 11-10 
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for basic provisions on corporate governance. Norway also has a corporate governance 
framework dedicated to SOEs.
60
 
 
1.2 The Research Problem 
 
Corporate governance is central to the effective and profitable management of 
corporations. This applies to all corporations. SOEs are in a unique position as they have 
to cater for commercial and social functions. Thus the need to develop and maintain a 
comprehensive corporate governance framework is even greater. The concept of 
corporate governance of SOEs in Uganda has received very little attention. This is 
evident in the Petroleum Bill 2010, which makes no reference to corporate governance, 
yet it provides for the creation of a NOC under the Companies Act. Further, as stated 
above, the current Companies Act Cap 110 has no Corporate Governance Code; however, 
it is under review and will be replaced soon. Although the Companies Bill 2009 provides 
for corporate governance, it makes it optional and does not cater for the corporate 
governance needs of SOEs. On the other hand, Norway has taken very big strides in 
building a formidable corporate governance framework. The Norwegian State Oil 
Company is one of the beneficiaries of good corporate governance in Norway. 
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
 
The main assumption which this study seeks to evaluate is: 
The absence of a comprehensive corporate governance framework in the proposed NOC 
under the Petroleum Bill 2010 is bound to create inefficiency and corruption in the 
management of the oil sector in Uganda.  
 
More than 90% of the world‘s proven oil and gas reserves lie in countries outside the 
OECD. If these resources are well managed, they can encourage growth and reduce 
                                                 
60
 Kallevig M ‗Ownership Function of the Norwegian State‘ (2005) OECD Russian Corporate Governance 
Roundtable meeting 5 (Hereafter cited as Kallevig M 2005) at 
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/21/35175246.pdf (accessed on 5 December 2010) 
and The White Paper No. 22 (2001-2002) On Reduced and Improved State Ownership 
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poverty on a large scale in such nations. With [weak governance]
61
 systems, however, 
large and concentrated revenue outflows can lead to corruption, unproductive use of 
resources and social unrest.
62
 
 
The evaluation of this major assumption shall entail discussion of the following minor 
assumption: 
 
State intervention and SOEs are justified in some sectors of the economy.  
 
1.4 Aims of the Study 
 
The strategic aims are: 
 
a) To propose corporate governance structures for SOEs and NOCs so as to address 
the lacunae in the Petroleum Bill 2010, the Companies Bill 2009, as well as other 
laws establishing SOEs.  
b) To build on further research in the area of corporate governance of SOEs and 
regulation of the natural resources sector in Africa. 
 
1.5 Scope 
 
The subject area of corporate governance is quite extensive, in light of the broad scope of 
the subject; a basic overview of the general principles of corporate governance has been 
undertaken. This comparative study is also limited to corporate governance in SOEs with 
particular reference to the National Oil Company of Uganda and the Norwegian State Oil 
Company as well as other relevant SOEs in Norway and Uganda. Various SOEs in 
Norway and Uganda have been cited as examples in the thesis. 
 
                                                 
61
 Emphasis mine. 
62
 Statoil ‗Mastering Challenges‘(2006) Statoil and Sustainable Development 8 (Hereafter referred to as 
Statoil 2006) at 
 http://www.statoil.com/en/EnvironmentSociety/Sustainability/Downloads/Sustainability_report_2006.pdf 
(accessed on 5 April 2011) 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
This study is based on literature on corporate governance, state intervention, SOEs and 
NOCs. A critical examination of the literature and the various schools of thought on the 
relevant subjects has been undertaken. The study is a comparative analysis and therefore 
involves a detailed review of the literature from Uganda and Norway on the areas 
indicated above. Literature in this instance includes but is not limited to: legislation of the 
above mentioned countries, guidelines, relevant texts and articles, among others. The 
recommendations for the different chapters are discussed simultaneously. A summary of 
the recommendations is presented in the last chapter. 
 
Norway presents a stellar example of a country that has effectively managed its oil and 
gas sector.
63
 It has continued to demonstrate that state intervention is an efficient tool in 
the management of the oil and gas sector.
64
 Though various countries
65
 have established 
NOCs, the Norwegian State Oil Company stands out for its transparency and good 
corporate governance.
66
 The above reasons, coupled with very good public governance in 
Norway, make the Norwegian State Oil Company ideal for comparison with the proposed 
National Oil Company of Uganda.
67
 The Norwegian example helps identify best practice 
for the operation of an NOC. 
 
The comparative analysis has taken note of the fact that the legal systems of Norway and 
Uganda are different; Norway operates a system which leans towards civil law
68
 while 
Uganda operates a system which is largely common law based.
69
 Nevertheless, as 
                                                 
63
 Figure 4.1 on the History of the Norwegian State Oil Company and the explanation thereafter in chapter 
4 of this thesis, strongly justifies this statement. 
64
 Figure 4.1 on the History of the Norwegian State Oil Company and the explanation thereafter in chapter 
4 of this thesis, supports the above proposition. 
65
 Table 2.1 in chapter 2 of the thesis shows some of the National Oil Companies in different countries. 
66
 Section 3.5 of chapter 3 of the thesis discusses the corporate governance framework for SOEs in Norway. 
67
 Graph 3.1 in chapter 3 on the Worldwide Governance Indicators supports the above argument. Broadly, 
the indicators show that Norway has very good public governance structures. 
68
 The legal system of Norway is said to be civil law although it borrows heavily from the common law 
system. See: ‗Brief Information About the Norwegian Legal System‘ 
:http://www.norlag.ge/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=63&Itemid=37&lang=en 
(accessed on 3 February 2011) 
69
 The Judicature Act Cap 13 Section 14 
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discussed above, both systems provide for NOCs. Norway has already established a NOC 
while Uganda is in the early stages of establishing a NOC. The convergence is that both 
systems provide for NOCs, although the NOCs are at different stages of development. 
Despite the difference in legal systems highlighted above, a comparative analysis is 
indeed feasible. 
 
Due to the intricacies involved in accessing information on the oil sector in Uganda, the 
study is mainly founded on available legislation. A more cogent study involving 
interviews with key people involved in the oil sector could surely provide more practical 
recommendations but this cannot be undertaken at this point in time; however, this may 
form the basis for further research in this area. Information regarding the oil sector has 
been shrouded in secrecy; the Ugandan Government only released the oil production 
sharing agreements to Parliament after enormous pressure.
70
 
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
 
The contribution of the oil sector to the economy of Uganda, a least developed country, 
merits discussion. It is worth noting that oil production may be the dawn of economic 
prosperity in Uganda. The IMF has noted that while it may be too early to forecast the 
benefits of oil production in Uganda, oil revenues are expected to exceed one third of 
total government revenue and to contribute 8 per cent of GDP.
71
Despite the importance 
of the oil sector to Uganda, literature, on the subject especially in the academia, is still 
thin. This study will attempt to address the gaps in the discussion of the proposed NOC 
and the oil sector in Uganda, which has not been substantially addressed in any existing 
literature. 
 
                                                 
70
See Kyalimpa J, Pressure mounts to make Public, Oil Agreements 
 http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=50548 (accessed on 2 November 2010) 
71
 Reported by Imara Africa Securities Team ‗What Oil Production will mean for Uganda‘s economy?‘ 
http://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com (accessed on 8 October 2010) 
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NOCs are an important institution in the management of oil resources, and this is evident 
in Norway.
72
 It has also been noted that the top oil companies today are NOCs.
73
 Uganda 
has chosen to follow this route and establish a NOC; thus it is imperative that the pros 
and cons are evaluated. 
 
The contribution of SOEs to investment, employment and other sectors of the economy 
cannot be understated. SOEs affect the livelihoods of quite a large number of people in 
Africa; thus, improvement of the management of SOEs will go a long way to improving 
the livelihoods of people in Africa. This study is a modest contribution in that direction. 
 
Globally, SOEs account for 20 percent of investment and 5 percent of employment. In 
Africa SOEs produce around 15 percent of GDP, in Asia 8 percent, and in Latin America 
6 percent. In Central and Eastern Europe, the state sector remains significant, accounting 
for 20 to 40 percent of output. Overall, SOEs play an important role in a number of major 
economies.
74
 
 
There is a dearth of corporate governance literature relating to SOEs in Africa. This 
makes it difficult for countries like Uganda to develop corporate governance frameworks 
for SOEs. The study will assist least developed and developing African countries to 
formulate corporate governance structures for SOEs. 
 
The fact that several SOEs and NOCs were privatized due to lack of transparency 
amongst other reasons, and that nonetheless the same have re-emerged makes this study 
very significant.
75
 
 
                                                 
72
 Statoil (2006) 10 
73
 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly ‗Ranking the World‘s Oil Companies‘ (2005) see: 
 http://www.energyintel.com/PublicationHomePage.asp?publication_id=4 (accessed on 4
 
January 2011) 
74
 Robinett D (2006) 1 
75
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 9 
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1.8 Chapter Outline and Overview 
 
1. Introduction and Background: 
The chapter provides a general background to the research, the rationale for the research 
and what the research seeks to achieve. The chapter also details the research question(s) 
that the research attempts to answer and the likely challenges attending the answering of 
these question(s). The chapter further illustrates the proposed approach in answering the 
research question(s). 
 
2. History, Understanding and Relevance of SOEs and NOCs: 
This chapter provides a general overview of SOEs and NOCs. It also underscores their 
functions and illustrates their contribution to development. The discussion in this chapter 
is guided by the concept of state intervention in the economy. The chapter also identifies 
the distinction between the organisation of SOEs in Norway and Uganda and makes some 
recommendations to improve the organisation and operation of SOEs in Uganda. The 
chapter also broadly analyses the origin of NOCs and provides arguments for and against 
the establishment of a NOC. 
 
3. Corporate Governance in SOEs : 
This chapter discusses the concept of corporate governance and theories of corporate 
governance. The chapter also briefly touches on the relationship between public sector 
governance and corporate governance. The discussion of corporate governance involves a 
critical examination of relevant legislation, codes and guidelines. The OECD principles 
of corporate governance and the OECD guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs are 
used as a benchmark for evaluation of corporate governance structures. The chapter 
concludes with an overview of the corporate governance frameworks for SOEs in 
Norway and Uganda. The chapter also makes some recommendations for reform of the 
corporate governance of SOEs in Uganda. 
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4. The Corporate Governance Structures in the Norwegian State Oil Company; 
Lessons for the Proposed National Oil Company of Uganda: 
This chapter examines the background to and history of the Norwegian State Oil 
Company. Moving forward, it critically analyses the management and governance 
structures of the company. Finally, the chapter examines the provisions for a NOC in 
Uganda, under the Petroleum Bill 2010, and, based on the structure of the Norwegian 
State Oil Company, proposes a corporate structure for the proposed National Oil 
Company of Uganda. 
 
5. Summary of Recommendations and Conclusion: 
This chapter provides a conclusion for the thesis. Further, it draws from the substantive 
discussion in chapters 2 to 4 and summarises the recommendations for Uganda regarding 
state intervention and SOEs, corporate governance in SOEs, and the proposed NOC of 
Uganda discussed in the above chapters. This is done against the backdrop of the 
Norwegian case study and the Norwegian State Oil Company. 
 
1.9 Conclusion 
 
The importance of a comprehensive corporate governance framework in the management 
of SOEs is critical to the efficient operation of these entities. This also applies to the 
proposed NOC of Uganda. While a certain degree of state intervention in the economy is 
justified in some key sectors, this has to be attended by a comprehensive corporate 
governance framework to succeed.  
 
The next chapter discusses the history and relevance of SOEs and NOCs. This provides a 
firm basis for the understanding of these entities and the need for specific tailor-made 
corporate governance structures, given their unique set-up and the roles that they have to 
play in the development of national economies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
HISTORY, UNDERSTANDING AND RELEVANCE OF STATE OWNED 
ENTERPRISES AND NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 
 
2.1 Introduction to State Intervention, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) 
 
It is important to understand SOEs and NOCs before engaging in the corporate 
governance debate and examining the importance of corporate governance to these 
entities. As discussed in chapter 1, section 1.1, NOCs developed during the era of 
increased state intervention.
76
 NOCs are also categorized under the genus of SOEs.
77
 
Thus the chapter begins with an analysis of state intervention, moves to SOEs and finally 
discusses NOCs. 
 
State intervention is part of the free market economy (laissez-faire) discourse.
78
 It is 
therefore not unusual that a discussion of one will elicit some exposition of the other. As 
elaborated earlier, it has been stated that state intervention dates way back in time.
79
 On 
the other hand, laissez-faire is said to be fairly recent and to have its origins in 18
th
 
century France.
80
 The author is of the opinion that the origin of state intervention 
discussed above, is based on the conceptualization of state participation under planned 
economies and not state intervention under market economies, which is the subject of 
discussion in this study. State intervention under market economies should have arisen at 
about the same time as the laissez faire economy.
81
 
 
                                                 
76
 Wainberg M F et al (2007) 4 
77
 Robinett D (2006) 1 
78
 See section 1.1 in chapter 1of the thesis. 
79
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 See section 1.1 of chapter 1 
80
 Taylor A Laissez-faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth-Century Britain (1972) Studies in Economics 
and Social History 11(Hereafter cited as Taylor A 1972) 
81
 See Section 1.1 in chapter 1 on the relationship between state intervention and the free market economy. 
State intervention is part of the free market economy. 
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Literature indicates that the 19
th
 century was largely
82
 an era where laissez-faire 
reigned.
83
 However, towards the end of the 19
th
 century, the free market economy came 
under attack.
84
 State participation re-emerged into the limelight in the 20
th
 century, 
especially after the Second World War.
85
 
 
It is important to note that while some economists advocate a complete free market 
economy, others, like Adam Smith, appreciated the need for some degree of government 
involvement in the economy.
86
  
 
Smith, indeed, goes back and forth when he expresses his opinion on the state‘s 
functions. To him, the least government is certainly the best, simply because he believes 
that governments are spendthrift, irresponsible, and unproductive. Nevertheless, he has a 
flexible view of government‘s role in promoting general welfare through public works 
and institutions.
87
 
 
State intervention indeed has a place in the pure free market economy discourse. 
Commentators, like Jacob Viner, have interpreted Adam Smith‘s attitude towards 
government involvement as capable of growth, if governments improved their standards 
of competence, honesty and public spirit and showed they were capable of handling 
wider responsibilities.
88
 
 
                                                 
82
 The term ‗largely‘ is used because as the author indicates; economists of note, such as J M Keynes The 
End of Laissez-faire (1926) at http://www.panarchy.org/keynes/laissezfaire.1926.html (accessed on 13 
March 2011) and other distinguished authorities viewed the whole of the 19
th
 century as an age of laissez-
faire. However some economists have also argued that by 1865, laissez-faire had lost its dominance. 
83
 Taylor A (1972) 51 to 54 The author is of the view that the statement in the foregoing source should be 
qualified. It is very unusual for laissez faire to exist in a pure form. Thus even in the 19
th
 century there was 
some state intervention. See section 1.1 in chapter 1 on the discussion of a market economy. 
84
 Taylor A (1972) 51 
85
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 The author is of the opinion, that, 
based on the discussion in section 1.1 of chapter 1, of the thesis, it is logical for one to state that the re-
emergence of state participation was more an increase in the degree of state participation. As noted above, 
state intervention should have existed at the time when laissez faire reigned. 
86
 Nagger T ‗Adam Smith‘s Laissez Faire‘ (1977) The American Economist, Vol. 21, Fall 35-39 published 
in Wood J C (ed) Adam Smith Critical Assessments (1984) (Hereafter cited as Nagger T 1977) 
87
 Nagger T (1977) 35-9 
88
 Viner J ‗Adam Smith and Laissez Faire‘ (1927) Journal of Political Economy 35 228-230 published in 
Wood J C (ed) Adam Smith Critical Assessments (1984) (Hereafter cited as Viner J 1927) 
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State intervention is further supported, to some extent, by economists, such as, David 
Ricardo and Alfred Marshall.
89
 Additionally, Tahany Nagger, discussing Keynes‘s 
general theory, states that the economy can no longer depend on laissez faire, guided only 
by forces of supply and demand to produce consistently high levels of employment.
90
This 
statement though primarily concerned with employment points to the need for state 
intervention in the economy.  
 
The arguments of Adam Smith and other scholars who are of the opinion that state 
participation is sometimes necessary in a market economy are relevant in budding 
economies. 
 
As mentioned earlier, support for state intervention is mainly founded in potential market 
failures and regulation failure.
91
  
 
2.1.1 Growth and Relevance of SOEs 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the growth of SOEs was greatly facilitated by the 
increased participation of the state in the economy after the Great Depression and the 
Second World War, among others.
92
  
 
Post War reconstruction in Europe and Japan pushed a number of governments to play a 
direct role in the economy and therefore to nationalise or found companies placed in 
―strategic‖ sectors, especially in energy, transport and banking segments.93 
 
Today, state ownership of resources and enterprises remains relevant in middle and low 
income countries despite widespread privatisation.
94
 In line with the above, research 
                                                 
89
 Nagger T (1977) 35-39 
90
 Nagger T (1977) 35-39 
91
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 See also section 1.1 of chapter 1, 
for a detailed discussion of market failure and regulation failure. 
92
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
93
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
94
 Robinett D (2006) 1 
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conducted by the World Bank indicates that for both political and economic reasons, the 
state will remain an owner of productive assets for years to come.
95
  
 
State ownership has been fronted as the best alternative to regulation, especially in 
instances where regulation by the state is not sufficient to meet the state‘s objectives.96 
State ownership has also been lauded as highly effective in circumstances where 
competition will not deliver optimum results.
97
 State ownership is also desirable where 
the state cannot guarantee that it will not confiscate or excessively tax enterprises.
98
 
Various other reasons have been advanced to support state ownership, including better 
labour relations and industrialization, among others.
99
 The above arguments have also 
met stiff resistance from detractors who argue for privatisation and liberalization. Further, 
it has also been argued that state ownership should be temporary to allow the state to 
develop regulatory capacity.
100
The above argument is subject to debate, as the duration of 
temporary state ownership is not indicated. 
 
The data indicated on the pie chart below (Graph 2.1), reveals the continued existence of 
SOEs in select countries. It should be noted that the pie chart and the countries used, are 
merely descriptive, showing the proportions of SOEs in select countries, and not intended 
for comparison. 
                                                 
95
 Robinett D (2006) 1 
96
 Robinett D (2006) 2 
97
 Robinett D (2006) 3 
98
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005) 20 
99
 Robinett D (2006) 3 
100
 Robinett D (2006) 3 
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Graph 2.1 
 
Sources: See below
101  
                                                 
101
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance in Eurasia, A 
Comparative Overview (2004a), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Experiences 
from the Regional Corporate Governance Roundtables (2004b), Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Principles of Corporate Governance (2004c), Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development Survey of Corporate Governance Developments in OECD Countries (2004d), 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Comparative Report on Governance of State 
Owned Assets (2005a), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines for the 
Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets (2005b); China: Qu Q ‗Corporate Governance and State-
Owned Shares in China Listed Companies‘ (2003) Journal of Asian Economics 14: 771–83, Mako et al 
‗State Equity Ownership and Management in China: Issues and Lessons from International Experience‘ 
(2004) Paper presented at the Policy Dialogue on Corporate Governance in China, Shanghai, The 
Economist (London) February 6, ‗A Survey of Asian Finance‘ (2003); Indonesia: Lee B H. ‗A Survey of 
Issues Relevant to an Organisational Change and Its Strategy at the Indonesian Ministry of State-Owned 
Enterprises‘ (2002) Jakarta unpublished paper and Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises ‗Master Plan: 
State-Owned Enterprises‘ (2002); Poland: Marta P ‗Corporate Governance in Treasury Companies‘ (2003) 
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The Ugandan data as indicated in the sources above represent both Statutory Authorities 
and SOEs, thus the SOEs, in the true sense of the word, are less than the figure indicated 
above.  
 
The selected countries represent a cross-section of countries at different levels of 
development, that is, developing countries, developed countries and regions, transition 
economies and least developed countries.
102
 Thus NOCs exist in all these varying 
economies.  
 
2.2 A Brief on State Ownership in Norway and Uganda 
 
2.2.1 Norway 
 
The legal framework under which State Owned Enterprises are organized in Norway 
includes the following major pieces of legislation; The Constitution of Norway of 1814 
as amended, especially Article 75, which enjoins the Parliament to supervise the 
economic affairs of the Kingdom; The Business Enterprise Registration Act No. 59, 
section 2-1, which provides for registration of Public Companies and other business 
enterprises; The Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act No. 45 of 13, 
chapter 2 on the formation of a Public Limited Liability Company; and The State Owned 
Enterprises Act No. 71 chapter 2 on formation of business entities which are fully owned 
by the state. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Paper presented at the 3rd meeting of the OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Assets (all the above are cited by Robinett D (2006) 2); Uganda: Office of the 
Auditor General ‗Annual Report of the Auditor General on the Financial Statements of Statutory 
Authorities and State Enterprises for the Year ended 30
th
 June 2009‘ (2009) at 
http://www.oag.go.ug/uploaded_files/1271768253Vol4%202008-2009%20Statutory%20Corporations.pdf 
(accessed on 4 February 2011); Norway See 
 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/nhd/selectedtopics/ownership.html?id=1336 on State Ownership in 
Norway (accessed on 16 February 2011). 
102
 Composition of Macro Geographical (continental) Regions, Geographical Sub-regions, and Selected 
Economic and Other Groupings See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm#developed 
(accessed on 17 February 2011) 
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History indicates that the state‘s direct participation in the economy started prior to the 
turn of the century, with the establishment of infrastructure based service provision and 
continued with the enactment of concession laws in 1906 to 1917, to protect the public 
interest in the exploitation of waterfalls for the production of electricity.
103
 Some scholars 
however locate state ownership in Norway, beyond the time frame suggested above; they 
are of the opinion that in the old days most of the industrial activity in Norway originated 
with the King who had control over the minerals and financed much of the mineral 
extraction.
104
 Prior to the Second World War, two factories manufacturing arms and 
ammunition were set up and a naval shipyard was also established.
105
 
 
State participation continued to grow especially after the Second World War with the 
establishment of the steel and iron industry and the acquisition of several German assets 
in several industrial companies.
106
 The foregoing state participation was preceded by a 
weak economy, insignificant private capital and the dominance of foreign capital.
107
 The 
establishment of Statoil in 1972 is reported to be the most significant national resource 
motivated ownership.
108
 
 
Research carried out in 2003 shows that about three-quarters of all Norwegian savings 
are controlled by the State.
109
 The research further shows that State ownership is quite 
extensive; this is illustrated by the fact that the state holds about 40 per cent of the total 
value of all companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
110
State ownership in Norway 
has been attributed to the desire for national control of utilization of natural resources and 
the need to develop infrastructure and infrastructure-based provision of services.
111
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While it may be argued that State ownership in Norway has been facilitated by the fact 
that it is a welfare state, it is interesting to note that state ownership has actually 
influenced the development of the welfare state.
112
  
 
Norway has recently started to revisit its public sector and many of the State Owned 
Enterprises have been incorporated into companies while others have been privatized.
113
 
Nevertheless, privatization has not been a dominant issue in the Norwegian 
reorganization debate.
114
 
 
 Net budgeted agencies, including administrative enterprises, statutory enterprises and 
Incorporated companies have all been used to organize the provision of services. The 
choice of organizational form has been determined by a number of factors, some sector 
specific, others such as labor concerns, public interest concerns, or international 
obligations, particularly those deriving from the European Economic Area Agreement 
(the EEA), have determined the organizational form chosen.
115
 
 
Administrative Enterprises are entities that are created by statute and are functionally 
separate from the state; they are organized along commercial lines with their own 
management structures.
116
 They are part of the state as a legal person and are included in 
the government budget.
117
 These are no longer common in Norway.
118
 Examples of such 
enterprises include the Directorate for Public Construction and Property and the 
Norwegian Mapping Authority.
119
 
 
On the other hand Statutory Enterprises are akin to private limited companies and operate 
as such, albeit with some limitations.
120
Their capital and income are not part of the 
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Treasury though they are wholly owned by the State.
121
Examples of entities that were 
established under this structure were the State Electricity Production Company and the 
State Electricity Network Company.
122
 
 
State Owned Incorporated Companies are those entities that were previously organized 
within the central government.
123
 
 
This is the preferred form of business organization in commercial and industrial activity 
in which no particular sectoral policy considerations apply, or where the enterprises 
operate in a competitively exposed market and are given this organizational form in the 
interests of business efficiency and freedom of action. Increasingly companies that are 
considered to be important policy instruments are nevertheless organized in this form in 
order to provide them with the greatest possible freedom to run the companies according 
to normal business practice.
124
 
 
The Companies Act in Norway has special provisions that relate to these companies, such 
as, the minister with the ownership role, is the general meeting.
125
 The Norwegian Public 
Broadcasting Corporation is an example of a corporation that was established under this 
model of organisation.
126
 
 
State Owned Incorporated Companies should be distinguished from Incorporated 
Companies with State Ownership, where the government owns either majority or 
minority shares.
127
Here, government influence is mainly exerted through the general 
meeting by voting with other shareholders.
128
 Statoil ASA is one of the entities organized 
under this model.
129
 Be that as it may, these Incorporated Companies with state 
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ownership are still SOEs as per the definition of SOEs seen above; they are linked to the 
government.
130
 
 
Corporatisation appears to be considered best practice for organizing SOEs in Norway.
131
 
This allows SOEs to compete with the private sector.
132
  
 
As earlier noted in chapter 1, Norway operates a legal system
133
 distinct from that of 
Uganda. The operation and organisation of its companies may differ to some extent from 
the structures and forms that are used in a common law system. 
 
2.2.2 Uganda 
 
The legal framework that regulates SOEs in Uganda is found in various laws creating the 
different SOEs. However, the basic laws under which SOEs are organized include: The 
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 as amended, Article 163(3) provides for the 
auditing of public corporations; The Companies Act Cap 110, Part II which deals with 
incorporation of companies and other matters incidental to incorporation; The National 
Audit Act 2008, Section 17 which deals with the auditing of public organisations; 
Sections 38 and 39 of the Public Finance and Accountability Act 6 of 2003, which 
provide for preparation of accounts by state enterprises and public organisations; The 
Public Enterprises Divestiture Act Cap 98, which provides for privatisation and reform of 
public enterprises, among others; and The Expropriated Properties Act cap 87, which was 
enacted to facilitate the return of private property taken by the military regimes. 
 
The history of state participation and ownership in the economy, in Uganda, is quite rich. 
Literature indicates that in 1948 the Uganda Electricity Board was established to take 
care of electricity distribution in Uganda; the colonial state established the Uganda Credit 
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and Savings Bank in 1950, the Uganda Development Corporation was established in 
1952, and the African Loans Fund in 1954.
134
 
 
The above appear to have been followed by the establishment of several parastatals. 
Some scholars are of the view that initially parastatals were established to carry out 
strategically and socially important functions at the national level, for example, the 
Uganda Electricity Board, and to establish new industrial ventures, such as the Uganda 
Development Corporation mentioned above.
135
  
 
Research further indicates that in May 1970 the government nationalized several 
enterprises including multinational subsidiaries and acquired stakes in others.
136
 
 
 SOEs continued to grow in 1972 with the expulsion of the Asians and the nationalization 
of several big private companies, such as, Kilembe Mines Limited in Kasese which 
belonged to Falconbridge of Canada, Lugazi sugar factory (Mehta Group) which 
belonged to the Mehta family, and the Kakira Sugar Factory (Madhavani Group) which 
belonged to the Madhavani family.
137
The state took over these businesses that belonged 
to Asian private owners. 
 
In 1977, following the collapse of the East African Community, several parastatals were 
created in Uganda, to take over services, such the posts and telecommunications, the 
airline industry, and the railway service.
138
These services had previously been provided 
by the East African Community; they were transferred to the government when the 
Community disintegrated. 
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After 1979, following the overthrow of President Idi Amin‘s government, Uganda 
initiated the return of various companies to their former private owners.
139
 These 
included: the Mehta Group, the Madhavani Group, and the Bata Shoe Company.
140
It is 
interesting to note that the return of companies and assets to former owners may have 
been interrupted by the political instability between 1979 and 1986. This is best explained 
by the fact that the process of return of expropriated assets and divestiture were only 
formally launched in 1983 and 1993 respectively.
141
Further support is found in several of 
President Yoweri Museveni‘s speeches, which strongly indicate that the state still had 
some interest in these formerly private companies and continued to support formerly 
private companies and parastatals between 1986 and the early 1990s.
142
  
 
As intimated above, in 1983, the Expropriated Properties Act cap 87 came into force.
143
 
The Act was made to facilitate the return of property taken by the military regimes. The 
long title of the Act states as follows; 
 
An Act to provide for the transfer of the properties and businesses acquired or otherwise 
expropriated during the military regime to the Ministry of Finance, to provide for the 
return to former owners or disposal of the property by the Government and to provide for 
other matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. 
 
This Act ensured that some of the property which had been expropriated by government 
was returned to the Asian private owners. Thus the state lost a stake in some of the Asian 
companies that were returned to the former owners. Nonetheless, there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the state continued to hold interests in various previously private 
companies. 
 
In the President‘s address on the first anniversary of the National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) Administration on January 26 1987, he noted thus: 
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In the one year we have been in power, we have carried out partial rehabilitation of the 
following enterprises: Nyanza Textiles, Uganda Blanket Manufacturers, Uganda 
Breweries, Nile Breweries, Lake Victoria Bottling Company etc.
144
 
 
We have also paid the debts of Uganda Airlines, partially rehabilitated Mulago 
hospital…145 
 
In the President‘s address at the state opening of the first session of the expanded 
National Resistance Council, on 11
th
 April 1989, he informed the Council that the 
rehabilitation of the Lugazi Sugar Factory had been completed the previous year and that 
production was estimated at 300,000 tonnes.
146
It is worth noting that in the same year, 
while speaking at the opening of the National Workshop for the Development of Small-
scale Industries, the President expressed gratitude to the private sector for being very 
dynamic and working towards building an independent economy.
147
 The above remarks 
indeed give credence to the operation of an open economy in the period between 1986 to 
the early 1990s. The support by the government extended to several corporations and the 
apparent interest of government in formerly private enterprises did not mean that the 
government discouraged private entrepreneurs. 
 
In 1990, while the President was addressing the state on the opening of the 4
th
 session of 
the National Resistance Council (NRC), he made the following remarks: 
 
We must expand and improve our processing and marketing structures. The Produce 
Marketing Board is going to improve its processing capacity so that it can handle half-a-
million tonnes of grain at any given time…Additionally, the Produce marketing Board 
and other government organs will continue to search for markets for our crops in order to 
fulfill our obligations to our trade partners…148 
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Further support for the proposition that Uganda continued to support SOEs in this period 
is found in the President‘s remarks in his address at the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation 
Conference held at Mweya in 1990, where he opined thus; 
 
My personal view, therefore, is that we should have used a mixture of market force and 
planned economy approaches, depending on convenience and individual countries‘ 
circumstances.
149
 
 
The above remarks also indicate that the government was open to participation of the 
private sector in the economy alongside SOEs. 
 
In 1993 the Public Enterprises Reform and Divestiture Statute was enacted and the 
process of privatisation was formally launched. The long title to the statute provides as 
follows: 
 
A Statute to provide for the reform and divestiture of public enterprises; to establish the 
Divestiture and Reform Implementation Committee charged with the implementation of 
the Government's program on the matter, and for other related matters. 
 
This statute is now referred to as the Public Enterprises Divestiture Act cap 98. The 
framework of reform and divestiture continues to this day. Government has recently 
advertised the divestiture of its interest in Kilembe Mines Ltd.
150
 
 
Currently, a large number of SOEs
151
 in Uganda remain overwhelmed by scandals. An 
example in point is the National Social Security Fund (NSSF). The Auditor-General‘s 
report for 2009 indicates a number of issues that taint the image of public enterprises in 
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Uganda.
152
 Some of the NSSF matters are presently being prosecuted in court and thus 
comments are restricted to this mini-thesis. 
 
Investigations conducted by the Auditor-General revealed that in 2007 NSSF entered into 
a contract to purchase motor vehicles under an operating lease. After the tender had been 
awarded, the terms were changed to hire purchase, without due regard to procedure.
153
 
This was done in total disregard of the procurement laws of Uganda.  
 
Further, investigations also revealed that top management used their offices to get salary 
advances, way beyond the amounts to which they were entitled.
154
  
 
NSSF had also acted contrary to procurement laws, when it entered into a joint venture 
with Nsimbe Holdings Ltd, disregarding the procedures set out under the law.
155
  
 
Additionally, NSSF entered into a joint venture with Victoria Property Development Ltd 
and advanced the private company a loan of US $ 1 million without authourisation from 
the minister responsible or the Board of directors.
156
  
 
The infamous Temangalo scandal
157
 which involved the purchase of several acres of land 
at ridiculous prices was also one of the scandals that rocked this astute institution which 
is mandated to provide social security services to employees in Uganda.
158
This is an 
example of the mismanagement of public enterprises in Uganda. 
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The history of SOEs in Uganda appears to show that their growth was more an accidental 
affair, which arose mainly out of crisis, as opposed to thorough economic planning. This 
is especially true for the period between 1970 and 1979. The history of the said 
enterprises is also marred by the various economic ideological orientations of the 
different political and military regimes that have ruled Uganda.  
 
In comparison, the SOEs in Norway appear to have arisen out of deliberate economic 
measures and policies. For example: Norway has a law to regulate State Owned 
Companies, even though the law relates only to those enterprises where the state is the 
sole owner. Norway also has a corporate governance regime for SOEs.
159
 This may 
provide an explanation for the failure of many SOEs in Uganda. The above state of 
affairs also lends credence to the argument that, if the SOEs in Uganda had been born out 
of deliberate well thought through economic policies and not out of crisis, then they 
would have better corporate structures and would indeed be vehicles for development and 
change. Norway has also had the advantage of dealing with SOEs for a much longer 
period than Uganda. This is attributed to the fact that it is a much older nation than 
Uganda. 
 
Additionally, Norway has undertaken corporatisation for most of its SOEs.
160
 This allows 
the SOEs to ably compete with the private sector. Uganda is following the same trend and 
it has been proposed that the NOC of Uganda should be an incorporated entity. This trend 
should be adopted for all SOEs. 
 
It may seem strange that despite the numerous problems associated with SOEs in 
Uganda, the country appears to be headed towards the creation of yet another SOE, which 
is the proposed NOC. However, as detailed above, state ownership and SOEs are still 
relevant in certain sectors of the economy and with proper corporate structures and a 
comprehensive corporate governance framework in place; these entities can be vehicles 
for development, as seen in Norway. Uganda‘s unpleasant experience with SOEs should 
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not be used as an excuse to shy away from these entities which are flourishing 
elsewhere,
161
 what is needed is for Uganda to put in place a strong corporate governance 
framework for SOEs. Uganda can follow the example of the unique SOE corporate 
structures in Norway, highlighted above; however this should be done cautiously given 
the fact that the two countries operate distinct legal systems. 
 
2.3 History and Relevance of NOCs 
 
2.3.1 History of NOCs 
 
As noted in the preceding chapter, NOCs were born at the time of increased state 
intervention in the economy.
162
 The aforementioned period covered mainly the first 25 
years after the Second World War.
163
  
 
The basic explanation for this involvement (outside of the communist areas where it was 
driven by ideology), was a widely held view that governments could and should address 
both social and economic problems.164 
 
Research further reveals that the first NOC was created in Austria over 100 years ago to 
ease the effect of excess supply of crude oil by constructing a topping plant owned and 
operated by the government.
165
 
 
In 1959, the major oil exporting countries in the world met in Cairo and agreed to consult 
on important issues. It was also agreed that countries form NOCs to increase direct state 
participation in the oil sector.
166
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It was believed at the time that market forces were not sufficient to propel developing 
countries from poverty.
167
 Suffice it to note, that developing countries had bad 
experiences with private international oil companies hence the motivation for national 
sovereignty over natural resources.
168
  
 
Foreign international oil companies were also seen as having international interests which 
did not coincide with national interests.
169
 In addition, the powerful private international 
oil companies were also seen as a source of foreign government interference with 
national objectives.
170
  
 
The fact that at the time oil was regarded as a strategic resource, as it was the major 
source of hard currency inflows for national treasuries, also justified the creation of 
NOCs in many countries.
171
  
 
The common opinion held at the time of nationalization of various oil companies in 
developing countries, was that private companies operating in a regulated sector could 
not develop a country‘s oil sector.172The rationale for state participation in the oil sector 
was that it could secure national interests more effectively than market forces.
173
 
 
State participation in the OECD countries was mainly driven by the Keynesian legacy, 
the Soviet example and market failure.
174
 The Soviet example was heralded by many as 
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the way forward in mobilizing resources of an economy to promote growth.
175
It should 
be noted that with the downturn of the Soviet economy, the Soviet example was used by 
critics of state intervention to justify privatisation. 
 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the reasons for state participation and ownership in 
the oil sector, and the growth of NOCs in different economies varied (that is between 
developed and developing countries) although market failure appeared to have influenced 
state participation and ownership in both the developed and developing countries. 
 
The table below (Table 2.1) shows the different years in which various NOCs were 
established in select developing countries. This list indicates that NOCs are not a new 
phenomenon in developing countries and they have been part of the economic strata for 
quite some time.  
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Table 2.1 
Select NOCs and Year Established 
Country NOC  Year 
Argentina YPFA 1922 
Chile  ENAP  1926 
Russia  Various 1934* 
Peru Petroperu 1934 
Bolivia YPFB 1936 
Mexico  Pemex 1938 
China PetroChina Early 1950 
Colombia Ecopetrol 1951 
Iran NIOC 1951 
Brazil Petrobas 1954 
India ONGC 1956 
Iraq  INOC 1961 
Saudi Arabia Petromin 1962 
Algeria Sonatrach 1965 
Indonesia Pertamina 1968 
Libya Libya NOC 1968 
Norway  Statoil 1972** 
Ecuador Petroecaudor 1973 
Malaysia Petronas 1974 
Kuwait KPC 1975 
Venezuela PdVSA 1976 
China  CNOOC 1982 
Sources: See below
176
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The term ‗developing countries‘ as used in the source of the data above is open to debate. 
Commentators have argued that countries, like Argentina, Brazil, India and China,
177
 can 
no longer be considered developing countries. It can however be argued, that at the time 
the NOCs were established those countries were indeed developing countries and some 
are still developing countries to-date.
178
Certainly Norway can no longer be considered a 
developing country. 
 
In the 1980s and early 1990s many of the NOCs were restructured and underwent partial 
or full privatisation.
179
 This was occasioned by the growing consensus at the time that 
government intervention was not the appropriate model for running state economies.
180
  
 
2.3.2 Current Position of NOCs  
 
Today, the wheel seems to be moving back to increased state participation in the oil 
sector.
181
 Commentators are wary of the growing inequalities that have been fostered by 
dependence on market forces, also the argument that market forces allow wealth to trickle 
down to all, is no longer tenable.
182
 Wealth generated by oil, is usually concentrated in 
particular sections of the economy and does not get down to the common man. 
 
Additionally, the inconsistency of the international financial system is pushing countries 
towards increased state participation.
183
 The foregoing statement shows that the market 
economy is not always efficient. The recent upsurge in oil and gas prices has revived 
perceptions of resource nationalism.
184
 Russia has recently nationalised Yukos and 
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Argentina has established a new state energy company, Enarsa, which will be involved in 
all aspects of the energy sector.
185
 This greatly justifies the creation of a NOC in this era. 
 
It should however be noted that privatisation of NOCs continues in certain countries, 
such as, China, Brazil, India, Pakistan, Norway and Japan.
186
 
 
2.4 Relevance of NOCS 
 
Several arguments have been advanced to show the relevance of NOCs. On a similar 
note, several arguments have been made to support the hypothesis that NOCs are 
irrelevant and have no place in the oil sector. The pros and cons for the establishment of 
NOCs are discussed below. 
 
2.4.1 Arguments for the Establishment of NOCs 
 
Some of the arguments that have been advanced to support the continued existence of 
NOCs are discussed below. These arguments are divided into political and economic 
arguments.
187
 
 
It has been argued that NOCs are an indispensable tool for mobilizing state policy at both 
national and international levels.
188
 It has also been argued that NOCs allow a 
government to implement appropriate energy policy and effective environmental 
protection.
189
 In Western Europe, five countries formed NOCs because they could not 
leave the formulation and realization of their energy policies to private oil companies.
190
 
Similarly, NOCs have been noted to ensure national mobilization of resources.
191
 NOCs 
encourage governments to optimally collect revenue and allocate resources to beneficial 
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national interests. It is noted that in many countries NOCs were established at the time 
when governments undertook a wave of asset nationalization, this might have been 
premised on the advantages discussed above.
192
Private international oil companies were 
seen as agents of foreign governments, and opposed to national interests.
193
NOCs helped 
promote sovereignty over natural resources, in this case oil.
194
This is particularly 
important in light of the bad experiences that were suffered by countries at the hands of 
private international oil companies.
195
 
 
NOCs as opposed to private international oil companies, also help to fulfil political and 
social tasks, which private companies are not willing to undertake.
196
This argument 
should be treated with caution as the duality of functions may encourage political 
interference in the long run and derail the enterprise from its core commercial functions. 
Nonetheless, the argument is of particular relevance to developing countries where NOCs 
may be used to provide employment to people with disadvantaged backgrounds or be 
used to provide and improve social services, like health and education, in the 
communities adjacent to the operations of the NOC. Additionally, NOCs can also be used 
in international dealings to secure external political support; this improves the country‘s 
reputation and bargaining position.
197
  
 
NOCs are also important in the construction of national pride.
198
 This motivated the 
creation of Petro Canada at a time when Canada was regarded as the latest addition to the 
USA.
199
 The creation of the NOC helped further the cause of sovereignty. In the 
developing countries, NOCs were regarded as symbols of independence in the post- 
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colonialism era.
200
 Developing countries have to build autonomous structures that allow 
them to manage their affairs with some degree of independence; this can be done through 
NOCs.  
 
From an economic perspective, NOCs are very good vehicles for dealing with market 
failure associated with information asymmetries between host governments and private 
oil companies.
201
 Control of private oil companies requires access to information from 
these companies, thus the creation of an NOC lessens the burden of accessing this 
information.
202
It has also been argued that in circumstances where NOCs are in 
competition with private oil companies, NOCs provide a yardstick for analyzing 
information needed to regulate the private oil companies.
203
 
 
Another argument on market failure is the fact that NOCs (especially where a NOC is the 
sole operator), as opposed to private oil companies, will collect all the revenue due to the 
country. Conventional fiscal instruments, such as, royalties, income taxes and production 
sharing contracts, are considered sub- optimal tools for collecting economic rent; they are 
too rigid to be applied in a dynamic international oil market.
204
 The above-mentioned 
instruments cannot be relied upon to collect all the revenue due and to hasten the process 
of development from the revenue received. 
 
Additional support is found in the argument that the contribution of the oil sector to the 
national economy is too important to be left solely to the private sector.
205
 Countries like 
Uganda which do not have laws to limit outflow of capital, may lose all profits from the 
oil sector, as the private oil companies repatriate profits to their home countries without 
reinvesting the same. Additionally, the oil sector in oil exporting countries accounts for a 
large portion of the GDP, government revenue and foreign exchange earnings.
206
 The 
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table (Table 2.2) below indicates the importance of the oil and gas sector to select oil 
exporting countries in 2003. It shows the oil and gas export percentage share of GDP and 
the fiscal oil and gas revenue as percentage share of GDP. 
 
Table 2.2 
The Importance of the Oil and Gas Sector for Select Oil Exporting Countries (2003) 
Country  Oil and Gas Exports as 
% share of GDP 
Fiscal Oil and Gas 
Revenue as % share of 
country GDP 
Saudi Arabia 38.3 28.1 
Norway 18.4 12.2 
United Arabs Emirates 36.8 35.8 
Nigeria 46.1 28.0 
Kuwait 44.8 48.1 
Libya 47.6 40.5 
Qatar 47.0 24.9 
Angola 65.3 28.3 
Equatorial Guinea 96.6 23.7 
Sources: See below
207
 
 
In all the above countries, oil significantly contributes to the GDP. Thus, there is 
sufficient incentive to motivate state involvement or direct control to secure both political 
and financial advantages.
208
Oil is considered to be the biggest business in the world.
209
 
Countries that trade in oil stand to benefit. Thus the oil sector should be protected to 
some extent by the state. This can be done through an NOC. 
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2.4.2 Arguments against the Establishment of NOCs 
 
The political and economic dichotomy is maintained in discussing the various arguments 
against the establishment of NOCs.
210
 
 
The attack on state intervention and the shift to control of state economies by market 
forces greatly crippled the concept of public enterprises.
211
 Tony Crosland, a noted UK 
socialist intellectual,
212
 described public corporations as being remote, irresponsible and 
immune from public scrutiny or democratic control.
213
Thus the above sentiments greatly 
motivate arguments against the establishment of NOCs especially those wholly owned by 
the state. 
 
Another argument against the establishment of NOCs is founded on the possibility of 
‗political take over‘.214NOCs are susceptible to excessive control by the state which 
makes them extensions of the civil service.
215
 SOEs and NOCs have to operate separately 
from the government. This is usually difficult especially where the corporate governance 
framework is weak. This makes NOCs susceptible to political capture. 
 
It has also been argued that NOCs may be subjected to conflicting objectives which may 
paralyse the operations of the company.
216
 NOCs sometimes have various bodies 
dictating policies in the industry. In situations where the body regulating the NOC cannot 
be clearly identified, various bodies may try to interfere with the operations of the NOC 
and to influence its decisions. Then the NOC may be subjected to conflicting objectives 
from the different bodies. 
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Looking at the economic arguments, Paul Stevens states that NOCs may be exposed to 
rent seeking as opposed to profit seeking, especially where bureaucrats seek rent for their 
own purposes.
217
 This may arise where bureaucrats strongly interfere with the operations 
of the NOC. This is also facilitated by corruption. A strong corporate governance 
framework for the NOC can substantially reduce this problem. 
 
Related to the above, and another argument that defeats the argument of establishment of 
NOCs, is inefficiency.
218
Linde notes that a leaked report by Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
indicated that Pertamina, the Mexican NOC, had lost about US $ 6.1 million to 
corruption and inefficiency.
219
 
 
It has also been argued the NOCs are not given sufficient funds for investment which 
makes them redundant in terms of maintaining or increasing production.
220
 Nigeria 
provides a classic example for this argument.
221
 In some cases, the funds from the NOC 
are used for other activities and the NOC is neglected. Where the NOC has an operational 
board of directors, which is in charge of running the company without external influence, 
or with minimal external influence, then the funds from the NOC will be invested in the 
NOC or in accordance with company policy, leading to the growth of the NOC. 
 
The argument that regulation of private companies operating in the private sector is the 
best mode of dealing with the oil sector, has also been advanced to discredit NOCs and 
their relevance in the oil sector.
222
 This argument has certain shortcomings: it presumes 
that private companies are the best entities to deal with oil resources in all circumstances. 
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This is not persuasive in light of the experience that countries have had with private oil 
companies.
223
 
 
The lack of proper corporate governance structures in many NOCs greatly discredits the 
creation of NOCs.
224
 
 
There is ample anecdotal evidence that the governance of NOCs typically compares 
unfavorably to private sector standards, whether it is regarding transparency, 
accountability, internal financial controls, commercial oversight or management 
structures.
225
 
 
SNPC was founded in 1998 and is the NOC of the Republic of Congo (ROC). Among the 
conditions for securing debt relief through the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program, 
the ROC has undertaken to improve the transparency and governance of its NOC. To this 
end, the government has allowed the publication of certain oil sector data and has agreed 
regular independent audits, conducted by KPMG. The audits to a large extent confirmed 
a lack of transparency and governance. In the 2003 audit, for example, KPMG found 
significant risks of errors and fraud related to weak internal controls and current 
governance
226
 
 
The lack of corporate governance in NOCs can be cured by establishing a corporate 
governance framework for SOEs and NOCs; thus this problem has a remedy. 
 
The relevance of NOCs and the reasons for the establishment of NOCs indicate that state 
participation is necessary in the management of the oil sector. This can be achieved 
through the creation of a NOC. Nevertheless, it is also important that private oil 
companies are involved either as shareholders or through loose joint ventures with 
NOCS, to ensure that the commercial functions of NOCs are not abandoned. Thus the 
organisational structure of the NOC has to be chosen carefully.  
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There are several valid reasons against the establishment of NOCs, and this makes it very 
difficult for one to make a general prescription that NOCs are the best method of 
engaging with the oil sector. However, these drawbacks can be cured by corporate 
governance and sufficient political will, to ensure that NOCs do not lose sight of their 
objectives. It has been observed that the shortcomings faced by NOCs are not tied to 
them and can be mitigated by appropriate institutional arrangements.
227
  
 
NOCs allow developing countries which lack proper regulatory capacity and frameworks 
to keep an eye on the sector.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The chapter has gone to great length to trace the origin and relevance of NOCs against 
the background of state intervention and the framework of SOEs. As discussed above, 
state intervention is not dead and still has a place in the contemporary economic 
discourse.  
 
SOEs still thrive in several critical sectors of state economies and allow states to keep 
watch over these sectors. It is very important that countries choose the appropriate form 
of organisation structure for their SOEs. The operation of SOEs does not mean that the 
private sector enterprises are abandoned or marginalized. The two can co-exist. 
 
NOCs are still relevant and may provide a solution for the management of the oil sector 
of oil producing countries, especially those which lack proper regulatory frameworks and 
capacity. It should be noted that Uganda is a budding economy and despite the unstable 
past relationship with SOEs, it should establish a NOC to comprehensively deal with the 
commercial aspects of its oil sector. Private oil companies maybe involved as 
shareholders or through loose joint ventures with the NOC to maintain the balance 
between social and economic objectives of the NOC. 
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The next chapter analyses the general concept of corporate governance and its 
relationship to SOEs. The chapter also briefly discusses the interaction between public 
sector governance and corporate governance. A brief overview of the corporate 
governance regime for SOEs in Norway and Uganda is also undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 
 
3.1 Background and Understanding of Corporate Governance 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) remain relevant in various economies around the world. Thus there is 
need for proper corporate governance structures to keep these business entities 
operational. This chapter discusses the broad concept of corporate governance and 
gradually focuses on corporate governance in SOEs. 
 
3.1.1 Origin of Corporate Governance 
 
The origin of corporate governance appears to differ according to various scholars. This 
may be attributed to the different meanings that are attached to the phrase. 
 
Some commentators opine that the concept of corporate governance is a fairly recent 
notion which is currently in a state of development.
228
Corporate governance is said to 
have its origins in the western economies where the practice has developed tremendously 
over the last two decades.
229
The concept has been exported to other economies through 
multinational enterprises.
230
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Corporate governance has also been traced to the creation of modern corporations in the 
19
th
 century and the notion of separate legal personality.
231
Corporate governance was 
meant to ensure that the interests of the owners were protected and maximized.
232
 
 
Additionally, some authors state that corporate governance developed over centuries 
owing to failures in the governance of business entities; they cite the South Sea Bubble 
scandal of the 1700s as one of the events that led to the development of corporate 
governance.
233
 
 
It is not easy to reconcile these different views; the origin of corporate governance 
depends on the conceptualization of the term. Since different scholars allocate different 
interpretations to the term, they are also inclined to hold different opinions as to when the 
concept was born. Scholars who trace the concept to the creation of the modern 
corporation are most relevant, at least from a legal perspective. 
 
3.1.1.1 Recent Trends in Corporate Governance: A South African Perspective 
 
Today, corporate governance has become a holy grail for good corporate practices in 
many countries. Apart from Norway, South Africa is one of the countries which have 
established a commendable corporate governance framework.
234
 The publication of the 
King Reports on corporate governance indicates the seriousness with which South Africa 
has approached the subject.
235
It is interesting to note, that the King Reports, especially 
King II of 2002 and King III of 2009, have introduced the concept of reporting on various 
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matters that affect stakeholders.
236
 These include; social, health, ethical and 
environmental practices as well as issues such as black economic empowerment.
237
  
 
King II was premised on the philosophy that governance in any context must reflect the 
value system of the society in which it operates.
238
 
 
South Africa has continued to raise the bar, by publishing King III of 2009, which affects 
all companies in South Africa and not particular targeted companies, like the corporate 
governance codes of most countries.
239
 The Code is based on the approach of ‗apply or 
explain‘ as opposed to ‗comply or explain‘, the former, is almost mandatory and indicates 
an intention to ensure good corporate governance in South Africa.
240
 The ‗comply or 
explain‘ approach is quite lenient and gives companies leverage to steer away from good 
corporate governance. 
 
The King Reports on corporate governance also apply to SOEs.
241
 This makes the reports 
quite comprehensive with regard to corporate governance. A specific protocol on 
corporate governance for SOEs has also been developed.
242
 South Africa presents a very 
good example of countries that have established comprehensive corporate governance 
frameworks for their companies. 
 
3.1.2 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance has been acknowledged as an issue of global importance; 
nevertheless the definition of corporate governance and its parameters are still open to 
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debate.
243
Corporate governance has been approached from multiple disciplines and is 
characterised by several definitions.
244
 Narrow and broad definitions have been adopted 
in the definition of corporate governance. The narrow approach to corporate governance 
constructs it in the following terms: 
 
The ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a 
return on their investment 
245
 
 
On the other hand, the broad construction of corporate governance construes it as: 
 
 The system of laws, rules and factors that control operations in a company.246 
 
The narrow and broad definitions of corporate governance in turn relate to the 
shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance and the stakeholder-oriented model, 
respectively.
247
 The main characteristic of the shareholder-oriented model of corporate 
governance is maximization of shareholder wealth while the major characteristic of the 
stakeholder-oriented model is wealth and value creation for all stakeholders.
248
 This 
research relies on definitions which address stakeholder interest due to the peculiarity of 
SOEs and NOCs. 
 
Sir Adrian Cadbury has defined corporate governance as the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled.
249
As noted earlier, in 2000 he added to the above definition 
stating that corporate governance is concerned with establishing a balance between 
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economic and social goals and individual and communal goals.
250
 Ramani Naidoo‘s 
definition of corporate governance, is quite similar to that elaborated by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury: she defines corporate governance as the practice by which companies are 
managed and controlled.
251
 
 
The Institute of Corporate Governance of Uganda (ICGU) adopts the definition advanced 
by Sir Adrian Cadbury in his report of 1992 cited above, but goes further to provide that 
it applies to both private and public companies.
252
 The Capital Markets Authority defines 
corporate governance in the following terms: 
 
Corporate governance, for the purposes of these Guidelines is defined as the process and 
structure used to direct and manage business affairs of the company towards enhancing 
prosperity and corporate accounting with the ultimate objective of protecting and 
promoting shareholders‘ rights and realizing shareholders‘ long term value while taking 
into account the interests of stakeholders.
253
 
 
The definition in the guidelines, though intended for listed companies, is comparable to 
the above definitions as it too points towards structures of control and management of 
companies; that said, the definition ultimately intends to offer protection mainly to 
shareholders with minimal protection of stakeholders. The definition and exposition by 
Sir Adrian Cadbury appear to include all stakeholders and not just shareholders. This 
renders the definition quite relevant to this research. 
 
The OECD definition of corporate governance is a hybrid of both the broad and narrow 
definitions of corporate governance.
254
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It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the various definitions are aligned to 
different theories of corporate governance. Some of the major theories are discussed 
below. 
 
3.1.3 An Overview of the Major Theories of Corporate Governance 
 
A basic examination of the theories of corporate governance is necessary for a grounded 
understanding of the corporate governance mantra.
255
This research will consider three 
major theories and locate the most relevant for purposes of SOEs. The theories to be 
considered are the agency theory, the stewardship theory and the stakeholder theory. 
 
3.1.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
The Agency theory is based on the hypothesis that in modern corporations, where shares 
are widely held, managerial actions depart from those required to maximize shareholder 
returns.
256
Authors, such as Fama and Jensen, have put it more explicitly, stating that the 
theory is based on the assumption that there is an inherent conflict between the firm 
owners and its management.
257
It is against the foregoing assumption that commentators 
have made the argument that adequate monitoring mechanisms need to be established to 
protect shareholders from management‘s self-interest.258 They further argue that a high 
proportion of external directors enhances a firm‘s performance.259Agung Wicaksono 
opines that the agency theory presupposes a contractual relationship between the 
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directors and the stakeholders.
260
 Thus checks and balances are put in place to ensure that 
the directors of a company act in the best interests of stakeholders.
261
 
 
The theory tends to focus more on shareholders as opposed to stakeholders, as it focuses 
on shareholder returns. The theory is also very difficult to apply to SOEs where there are 
numerous principals or stakeholders. Additionally the theory fails to clearly draw a 
distinction between directors and managers. 
 
Agency has been defined as a relationship which arises between two parties, agent and 
principal, where the principal authorises the agent to act on his behalf and the agent 
acquiesces.
262
 In a company the directors don‘t act on behalf of the shareholders; the two 
bodies, the board and the general assembly are distinct organs, acting for the company.
263
 
Thus the agency relationship is difficult to fathom, except for cases where a contract 
exists for some particular purpose, which creates such a relationship between the two 
organs. 
 
Related to the foregoing discussion, the relationship of agent and principal between 
directors and shareholders has been the hub of a sizeable amount of litigation over the 
years.
264
 This to a great extent stands to discredit the theory. The duties of directors are 
owed to the company and not shareholders.
265
 Common law also lays emphasis on the 
division of powers between the board and the shareholders.
266
 This division of powers is 
detailed in the articles of the company.
267
 Thus the basic foundation of the theory is 
questionable. 
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Gower points out that until the 19
th
 century the shareholders in general meeting were 
considered the company while the directors were only agents of the company.
268
 It is 
further noted by Berle and Means that while these agents had wide powers; they were 
accountable to and indeed governed by the owners of the company.
269
The shareholders in 
general meeting may act for the company in certain instances, as provided in the articles. 
However, this does not make them the company. The case of Salomon V Salomon,
270
 
established the principle of separate legal personality, which makes the company separate 
and distinct from its shareholders.  
 
The various cases detailed below broadly map out the general background to this debate 
in the common law jurisdictions. In the case of Foss V Harbottle
271
 it was held inter alia 
that the directors were always subject to the superior control of the proprietors assembled 
in general meeting.  
 
In Isle of Wight Railway Co. V Tahourdin, 
272
Cotton L.J stated thus: 
 
It is a very strong thing indeed to prevent shareholders from holding a meeting of the 
company, when such a meeting is the only way in which they can interfere, if the 
majority of them think that the course taken by the directors, in a matter intra vires of the 
directors is not for the benefit of the company. 
 
The foregoing averment indicates that directors were then considered inferior to the 
general meeting and the general meeting was allowed to interfere with decisions of the 
directors even where such decisions were made intra vires. This lends credence to the 
view that directors were regarded as agents of the shareholders at the time. 
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The case of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd V Cunninghame 
273
appears to have changed the trend. The court stated that the division of powers 
between the board and the shareholders in general meeting depended in the case of 
registered companies on the construction of the Articles of Association and that where 
powers had been vested in the board by the Articles, the general meeting would not 
interfere. This case established that directors were not the agents of the shareholders.
274
 
 
The above position was approved in 1908 in the case of Gramophone & Typewriter Ltd V 
Stanely
275
where Buckley LJ stated thus: 
 
The directors are not servants to obey directions given by the shareholders as individuals, 
they are not agents appointed by and bound to serve the shareholders as their principals. 
They are persons who may by regulations be entrusted with the control of the business 
and if so entrusted they can be dispossessed from that control only by the statutory 
majority which can alter the articles.  
 
The above cited case appears to have been overridden by the decision in Marshall’s 
Valve Gear Co V Manning Wardle & Co.
276
However in Quin & Axtens V Salmon
277
 the 
position established in the Automatic Self Cleansing case
278
 was followed. The position 
that directors are not agents of shareholders was succinctly stated in Shaw & Sons 
(Salford) Ltd V Shaw
279
 as follows: 
 
A company is an entity distinct alike from its shareholders and its directors. Some of the 
powers may, according to its articles, be exercised by directors; certain other powers may 
be reserved for the shareholders in general meeting. If powers of management are vested 
in the directors, they and they alone can exercise that power…Shareholders cannot usurp 
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the powers which by the articles are vested in the directors any more than the directors 
can usurp the powers vested by the articles in the general body of shareholders. 
 
Scott V Scott
280
 maintains the foregoing position. The general meeting and the directors 
are considered organs of the company rather than agents of the company.
281
Thus the 
Agency theory appears to be founded on shaky ground, at least from a legal 
perspective.
282
 The necessity for the owners to create checks and balances for the board is 
indeed a positive attribute, but the underlying presumption that directors are agents of the 
owners of the company belies the whole principle of separate legal personality. The 
presumption that the shareholders are the company is no longer tenable in law and as 
such directors cannot be agents of the shareholders. The above position discussed in the 
cases above, has to some extent, been affected by the power granted to the shareholders 
under statute in England, to remove directors at any time, by ordinary resolution.
283
 This 
sometimes forces directors to follow the wishes of the shareholders. Despite the existence 
of such powers, it does not make the directors agents of the shareholders. 
 
Norwegian legislation regulating public companies does not envisage an agent-principal 
relationship between shareholders and directors. The functions of the shareholders in 
general meeting and the board of directors as well as other bodies are all distinct.
284
 
Further, resolutions of the corporate assembly and the board of directors in section 6-37 
cannot be reviewed by the shareholders in general meeting except where the King grants 
special permission.
285
Norwegian legislation provides for a number of organs involved in 
the election of the board of directors, such as, the nomination committee and the 
corporate assembly.
286
Thus the shareholders and directors are subjected to other bodies. 
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In Norway, just like in Uganda, registered companies are distinct entities separate from 
the shareholders.
287
 
 
The foregoing discussion has also been the subject of contemporary research intended to 
re-cast the classic agency theory of corporate governance.
288
Luh Luh Lan and Loizos 
Heracleous argue that the board is not the agent of the shareholders but rather an 
autonomous fiduciary that is entrusted with power to act for and on behalf of a 
beneficiary.
289
 
 
3.1.3.2 The Stewardship Theory 
 
The Stewardship theory is founded on the assumption that individuals are not solely 
motivated by self-interest but also by altruism, generosity and service to others.
290
The 
theory presupposes that managers are good stewards of firms and that they want to be 
good stewards of corporate assets and not make secret profits at the expense of 
shareholders.
291
This theory is mainly built on trust between the principal and steward and 
achievement of aligned goals between the directors and shareholders.
292
The theory is 
almost a reversal of all the major assumptions that form the basis of the Agency theory. 
The table below (Table 3.1) provides the major distinctions between the Agency theory 
and the Stewardship theory of corporate governance. 
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Table 3.1 
Major Differences between the Agency Theory and the Stewardship Theory 
 Agency Theory Stewardship Theory 
Assumption of human 
behaviour. 
Agents are opportunistic 
and self-serving. 
Stewards are 
trustworthy and work 
for the benefit of the 
corporation. 
Primary role of 
supervisory board 
Board members control 
and monitor managers. 
Board members provide 
managers with 
expertise, resources, 
network and power. 
Source: See below
293
 
 
The theory is very idealistic and ignores directors‘ self-interest. If the assumption is 
indeed true, that the board acts in the best interest of the company at all times, there 
would be very little need for corporate governance. The rampant levels of corruption in 
various companies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the recurrence of corporate scandals 
around the globe, casts a shadow on the viability of this theory.
294
 Further, the theory, 
like the Agency theory, is still shareholder oriented and focuses on shareholders as 
opposed to stakeholders; this makes it difficult for use as a tool in analyzing the corporate 
governance of SOEs. 
 
It has been suggested by some authors, that the issue whether the board acts as a monitor 
of the management on behalf of the shareholders, or a conduit for management 
domination of the company, requires empirical investigation.
295
 Thus the agency theory 
which considers the board as an agent of the shareholders and the Stewardship theory, 
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which considers the board as guiding management and acting in the best interests of the 
company, require further investigation. 
 
3.1.3.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Defining stakeholders in a company is not an easy task, because there are various parties 
with long-term interests in a company.
296
 These may include special interest groups, civil 
society, employees and the public at large. Employees have been recognized as 
stakeholders in the company, in about half the member states in the European Union.
297
 
 
A company‘s stakeholders are ‗those whose relations to the enterprise cannot be 
completely contracted for, but upon whose cooperation and creativity the company 
depends for its survival and prosperity.
298
 
 
The theory is based on the argument that besides shareholders, there are other parties and 
parts of society that are interested in the corporation.
299
The theory is said to have arisen 
in the 1970s due to societal fears that large corporations had become too powerful to be 
accountable only to shareholders.
300
It is posited by some authors that the theory provides 
the basis for a mode of corporate governance which takes into account not only profit 
making but also ethical and public concerns.
301
The theory appears to fit in with the 
exposition on corporate governance offered by Sir Adrian Cadbury stating that corporate 
governance is concerned with establishing a balance between economic and social goals 
and individual and communal goals.
302
 It has been noted, that considering societal 
concerns about business and the various stakeholders is good business practice and 
determines an entity‘s success in the long term.303  
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The Stakeholder theory is related to the emerging concept of corporate social 
responsibility. Corporate social responsibility has been defined as the commitment of 
businesses to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with their 
employees, families, the local community and society at large, to improve their lives in 
ways which are good for business and for development.
304
 Corporate social responsibility 
further justifies the supremacy of the Stakeholder theory of corporate governance over 
other theories. Corporate social responsibility is closely related to the Stakeholder theory 
and advocates for involvement of stakeholders in the governance of the corporation. This 
is especially important for SOEs which have social responsibilities. 
 
In comparison to the Agency and Stewardship theories, the Stakeholder theory is best 
suited for the examination of corporate governance in SOEs. This is because of its 
comprehensive approach that considers all stakeholders and in essence the public at large. 
Due to the nature of SOEs, the public has a keen interest in the way SOEs operate, 
irrespective of the fact that members of the public may not be direct shareholders but 
merely stakeholders.  
 
3.2 The Relationship between Public Governance and Corporate Governance 
 
Related to the discussion of the Stakeholder theory above, is the concept of good public 
governance. 
 
Public governance has been defined as the relationships that exist between Parliament 
and the Executive, on the one hand, and Ministers and management of public sector 
agencies, on the other hand, focusing on accountability and responsibility for the 
                                                 
304
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management of public resources and delivery of programs and services.
305
 It is also noted 
by the proponents of the above definition that effective and sound public governance 
arrangements are crucial for the management of national resources.
306
  
 
Public governance has a direct impact on the management of SOEs. The governance 
discourse of SOEs goes beyond corporate governance and is directly or indirectly 
influenced by public governance. Based on the foregoing discussion, one can argue that 
proper corporate governance can only flourish in a well structured public governance 
framework. This is based on the fact that Parliament makes the laws and the Executive 
makes policy, which laws and policies in turn affect the management of SOEs. Related to 
the above statement, it has been argued that NOCs require good governance at both the 
public sector level and the corporate level.
307
 
 
The above discussion is intended to locate the corporate governance discourse in the 
broader public governance discourse. The concept of corporate governance does not 
operate in the abstract but is greatly influenced by public governance. Good public 
governance is a prerequisite for the establishment of a proper corporate governance 
framework for SOEs and NOCs. 
 
The worldwide governance indicators provide a snap shot of the importance of good 
public governance. As previously noted, the Norwegian model (the Norwegian NOC is 
one of the constituents of this model) of management of oil as a natural resource has been 
heralded as one of the best in the management of natural resources.
308
 The worldwide 
governance indicators indeed show that Norway is performing quite well in terms of 
governance. The indicators are based on Voice and Accountability (V&A), Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence (P&AV), Government Effectiveness (GE), Regulatory 
Quality (RQ), Rule of Law (RL) and Control of Corruption (CC). The graph below 
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(Graph 3.1) shows the percentile ranking of Norway in comparison to that of Uganda for 
2009.  
Graph 3.1 
Worldwide Governance Indicators: Performance of Norway and Uganda (2009) 
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309
  
 
The percentile ranking of Norway in the various governance indicators shows the 
country‘s stellar performance with an average rank above 90 per cent. On the other hand, 
Uganda appears to be struggling with an average percentile ranking of about 30 per cent. 
It can be argued that given the good governance record of Norway, its SOEs and NOC 
have a strong foundation for good corporate governance. Uganda needs to improve in 
terms of public governance, if it is to build a strong corporate governance framework. It 
is conceded that Uganda being a least developed country, will take time to achieve 
optimum good public governance, relative to that in Norway. However, an effort has to 
be made to kick-start the process. Commentators have argued that the success of 
                                                 
309
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Norway‘s oil industry is attributed to the mature and open democracy which prevails in 
the country.
310
 
 
It is also worth noting that good corporate governance may positively influence good 
public governance. Some commentators have opined that due to the centrality of the 
corporation today, the regulation of the corporation greatly influences society.
311
For 
example, if corporations in a country have good corporate governance structures and are 
properly governed, they are bound to operate more profitably and this has a positive 
effect on the economy of the country. Thus government receives sufficient resources to 
allocate to the different organs of government to ensure that they operate smoothly. 
 
3.3 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
The OECD principles of corporate governance, originally adopted in 1999 and revised in 
2004,
312
 have gained prominence as the standard measure for corporate governance the 
world over.
313
 Though the principles are not binding on its members, they offer a 
standard of good practice. The principles have been recognised by the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund, and non-OECD countries, among others.
314
While the 
principles are said to apply to mainly publicly traded companies, they are also a good 
guide to non-traded companies.
315
 Arguments have recently emerged criticizing the 
principles. The nay-sayers are of the view that the principles may not be very effective in 
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combating corporate governance problems in emerging economies.
316
 However these 
arguments focus on particular issues, such as, controlling-shareholder expropriation,
317
 
needless to say, such arguments are too few and far between. The OECD principles are 
discussed below. 
 
3.3.1 Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
 
The basis for an effective corporate governance framework has been fashioned in the 
following terms by the OECD: 
 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient markets, 
be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of responsibilities 
among the different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.
318
 
 
It is clearly apparent from the forgoing that the first principle envisages a broad base for 
corporate governance: that is, that the economic system, the legal regime and the relevant 
institutions should be in sync with the corporate governance framework. This principle 
greatly relates to the nexus between public governance and corporate governance 
discussed above. This underpins the fact that corporate governance can only flourish in 
an economy with good public governance.
319
Transparent markets will only exist if there 
is transparency in the companies. Transparency is important in all corporate matters, 
especially the auditing process. A lot of people who invest in companies strongly rely on 
financial reports by, among others professionals and auditors.
320
 Similarly rating 
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organizations and bankers depend on accurate reporting.
321
 Thus the auditing process and 
the information generated from the audit should not be tainted with fraud and there 
should be full disclosure. 
 
3.3.2 The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions 
 
This principle largely deals with protection of shareholders‘ rights and ensuring that a 
proper environment exists in the company for the exercise of these rights. 
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate exercise of 
shareholders‘ rights.322 
 
The shareholders contribute capital, monetary or otherwise, to the establishment of the 
company.
323
 Thus they have a particular interest in the company and the way the business 
is run. Usually a company is managed in accordance with the Articles of Association and 
the Memorandum. All actions in the Articles that require approval by a vote of the 
shareholders in general meeting should be left for this august body. The board of 
directors should not be seen to usurp the powers of the shareholders. This may be done 
through availing all the necessary information to the shareholders in a timely fashion. The 
principles provide that shareholders should have the right to remove board members, and 
that they should participate in nominating directors.
324
 
 
3.3.3. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
In line with the above discussion, the importance of shareholders cannot be understated, 
both majority shareholders and all other shareholders. The OECD principles state thus: 
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The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.
325
 
 
While shares may be divided into classes, all shares of a particular class should have the 
same rights and holders of shares in a certain class have to be treated equally.
326
 Further, 
minority shareholders and foreign shareholders should be protected by the corporate 
governance framework.
327
 Related to this discussion, the common law has come out 
strongly to protect minority shareholders.
328
 In the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the common law presumes that all shares confer equal rights and impose equal 
liabilities.
329
 It is noted, that where minority shareholder protection is insufficient, 
controlling shareholders capture decision making and thus obtain the leverage to extract 
private benefits from the company.
330
This may in the long term also affect the controlling 
shareholders as it affects the company‘s access to capital.331 
 
3.3.4 The Role for Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
Stakeholders play an important role in the ensuring the smooth running of business 
entities. The OECD principles state as follows: 
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability of 
financially sound enterprises.
332
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As elaborated in the discussion above on the stakeholder theory of corporate governance, 
consideration of the various stakeholders may determine the success of a business entity 
in the long run.
333
Gamble and Kelly, commenting on corporate social responsibility, are 
of the view that the company‘s ‗licence to operate‘ is derived from the public interest.334 
Stakeholders in a company, especially an SOE, are quite diverse and may include the 
whole public or merely part of the public. It is noted, however, that the conceptualization 
of stakeholders by this principle is limited, as it only considers stakeholders established 
by law or mutual agreement. Various stakeholders may exist without any direct 
relationship to the company, as is envisaged by the principle. The company owes a duty 
to all these stakeholders as well and they should be included in the corporate governance 
framework of the company. An example is civil society groups and consumer groups 
which have interests in the operation of the company, yet there is no direct relationship as 
is envisaged by the principle. Further, the duty owed by the business entity to 
stakeholders is not always economic, as elaborated in the principle, but may be social, 
such as, education and health services, among others. 
 
3.3.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
 
Material information regarding financial and other aspects of management should be 
availed to all stakeholders in time. 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company.
335
 
 
The disclosure of material information to all stakeholders is a very important aspect of 
corporate governance.
336
 This helps stakeholders make informed decisions
337
 and to 
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query suspicious activities by the company. Appreciation of financial information is a 
dilemma to most stakeholders and presents a very serious problem in ensuring proper 
corporate governance. Sensitisation of stakeholder groups and the general public on 
financial reports is necessary if this information is to be understood and used 
productively. Related party transactions are also regulated by this principle.
338
 It is 
necessary for a company to have independent directors who can evaluate, and where 
necessary block related party transactions.
339
Beneficiaries of such transactions should 
notify the board which should then disclose to the market the existence of such a 
transaction.
340
 
 
3.3.6 The Responsibilities of the Board 
 
The board which is in charge of the day to day supervision of management has a very big 
role to play in ensuring the successful operation of any corporation.
341
 The OECD 
Principles state as follows: 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board‘s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders.
342 
 
The principle requires board members to act in good faith towards the company and the 
shareholders. It encourages Boards to take their fiduciary duties seriously.
343
 The 
principle is limited, as it concentrates on shareholders and does not encourage the board 
to act with due regard to the interests of stakeholders.  
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The OECD Principles, as indicated above, have been lauded and followed by several 
notable organisations. They provide a good background for the development of a 
corporate governance regime. It is worth noting that the OECD Principles appear to focus 
more on shareholders as opposed to stakeholders and this has to be rectified to strengthen 
the Principles. 
 
3.4 OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises 
 
Chapter 2, section 2.1.1 and Graph 2.1, highlighted the immense contribution of SOEs to 
the economies of various countries in the world. The OECD countries are no exception, 
and indeed it has been acknowledged that SOEs greatly contribute to the economic 
strength of the OECD countries.
344
 
 
Against this background, the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance asked the 
Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate Governance of State Owned Assets to 
come up with Corporate Governance Guidelines for SOEs.
345
The Guidelines are custom 
made for SOEs and this makes them unique. It should be noted that these Guidelines are 
modeled along the OECD Corporate Governance Principles elaborated above.
346
The 
complex accounting system of SOEs which involves multiple actors, such as, government 
ministries, the board and other parties is one of the factors that distinguishes SOEs from 
other corporations.
347
The Guidelines are primarily intended for SOEs that are using a 
distinct legal form and are commercially active.
348
The Guidelines are also buttressed with 
sub guidelines which are discussed below where necessary. 
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3.4.1 Ensuring an Effective Legal and Regulatory Framework for State Owned 
Enterprises 
 
This guideline builds on the first
 
principle of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. It provides for transparency and consistency with the rule of law, among 
other factors, and ensuring that the corporate governance framework is compatible with 
the legal framework in place. The guideline provides as follows: 
 
The legal and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level- 
playing field in markets where state owned-enterprises and private sector companies 
compete in order to avoid market distortions. The framework should build on, and be 
fully compatible with, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.349 
 
It has been argued that the complex legal and regulatory framework within which SOEs 
operate can be protected from abuse by among others, clear division of responsibility 
among authorities, streamlining of legal forms, and a coherent regulatory 
framework.
350
The author is of the opinion that the above is recommended to keep the arm 
of the state from interfering with the operations of SOEs. SOEs should operate on level 
terrain with other corporations; they should not be protected from proceedings by 
creditors.
351
 Further, the guideline can also prevent the creation of monopolies by the 
state and encourage competition with the private sector. Monopolistic situations have 
been identified as one of the common weaknesses of governance and causes of 
compliance failure.
352
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3.4.2 The State Acting as Owner 
 
The status of ownership by the state has to be clarified at the outset. The state merely 
plays the role of owner
353
 of shares in a SOE; it holds the shares of the enterprise on 
behalf of the citizens who are the owners of the same. Against this background, the 
argument that the SOEs have numerous stakeholders stands firm. The OECD guideline is 
couched in the following terms: 
 
The state should act as an informed and active owner and establish a clear and consistent 
ownership policy, ensuring that the governance of state owned-enterprises is carried out 
in a transparent and accountable manner, with the necessary degree of professionalism 
and accountability.
354
  
 
The state should always act in the best interests of the stakeholders. The state should have 
a cogent ownership policy for SOEs; this should provide the objectives for SOEs and 
indicate the state‘s role in the corporate governance framework of SOEs.355Additionally, 
the state should also ensure that SOEs are autonomous and that boards of SOEs operate 
in an independent atmosphere.
356
Independence of the boards is necessary to efficiently 
supervise management and deal satisfactorily with conflicts of interests, such as, 
remuneration.
357
 Further, the entity that exercises the ownership function of the state 
should be clearly spelt out.
358
The ownership entity should be accountable to another body 
such as parliament, to create checks and balances.
359
The lack of accountability may lead 
                                                 
353
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to loss of investor confidence and public trust.
360
 The state should also fully exercise its 
rights as a shareholder; such as, participating in shareholder meetings.
361
 
 
3.4.3 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders 
 
This guideline is modeled on the same terms as the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance albeit with a slight modification to accommodate SOEs. The guideline 
provides for the equal treatment of all shareholders who hold the same class of shares, 
and for non-discrimination in providing information to shareholders.  
 
The state and state-owned enterprises should recognise the rights of all shareholders and 
in accordance with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance ensure their equitable 
treatment and equal access to corporate information.
362
 
 
This is meant to ensure that all shareholders are treated equally in accordance with the 
rights attending the different classes of shares that they hold.
363
 Information should also 
be provided to all shareholders on time. Participation in company meetings, especially 
voting, should be done with due regard to the rights and interests of all 
shareholders.
364
Similarly to the Scandinavian countries, the equitable treatment of 
shareholders is greatly revered in the common law jurisdictions and it is for this reason, 
among others, that voting at company general meetings is primarily conducted by show 
of hands, 
365
that is, each shareholder has one vote irrespective of the number of shares 
held.
366
 Protection of minority and foreign shareholders is also necessary, as highlighted 
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in the foregoing discussion on equitable treatment of shareholders under the OECD 
Principles.
367
 
 
3.4.4 Relations with Stakeholders 
 
This guideline is similar to the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance.
368
 It is 
particularly relevant to SOEs as they tend to engage with more stakeholders in 
comparison to other companies. The guideline provides that: 
 
The state ownership policy should fully recognise the state-owned enterprises‘ 
responsibilities towards stakeholders and request that they report on their relations with 
stakeholders.
369
 
 
This language used seems very weak and does not compel states and SOEs to give the 
guideline the priority it deserves. The use of the terms ‗recognise‘ and ‗request‘ is very 
lenient. The sub-guidelines however use the term ‗should‘370 in relation to reporting; this 
is the preferred language and should be adopted in the main guideline to avoid ambiguity. 
The guidelines generally appear to place a far greater emphasis on the protection of 
shareholders as opposed to stakeholders. Thus there is a need to magnify the status of 
stakeholders in the guidelines generally, and in this particular guideline, by the use of 
stronger language. As noted in the general Principles above,
371
 the guideline also focuses 
on stakeholders recognised by law or mutual agreement.
372
 This construction is quite 
narrow. The guideline should provide for all stakeholders. Lastly the guideline provides 
that boards of SOEs should be required to develop and communicate compliance 
mechanisms for internal codes of ethics.
373
These codes will enhance the conduct of 
boards of SOEs and instil discipline in the board members and management. The 
stakeholders will then be able to monitor and challenge the actions of board members and 
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other officers of the company. Stakeholders greatly determine the performance of an 
SOE.
374
 
 
3.4.5 Transparency and Disclosure  
 
In line with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, the guidelines provide as 
follows; 
 
State-owned enterprises should observe high standards of transparency in accordance 
with the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.375 
 
This mainly relates to the practice of sound accounting procedures and conducting of 
internal and external audits of SOEs.
376
 The results of these audits should also be 
published and made available to the stakeholders on time.
377
 Information regarding 
management of the SOE should also be availed to the public.
378
Auditors should carefully 
evaluate a company‘s internal control in greater depth as part of the financial statement 
audit.
379
 As discussed above, there is a need to sensitize the public on the interpretation 
and analysis of financial statements and other similar reports, if their disclosure is to yield 
fruit and encourage debate on the management of SOEs. Transparency and total 
disclosure helps interested parties, such as investors, make informed decisions.
380
 
 
3.4.6 The Responsibilities of the Boards of State Owned Enterprises 
 
This guideline is consistent with the OECD Principles elaborated above.
381
 As mentioned 
earlier, the board plays a pivotal role in running any corporation.
382
 As such, the board is 
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enjoined to act in good faith and in the best interest of the company. The guideline states 
that: 
 
The boards of state-owned enterprises should have the necessary authority, competencies 
and objectivity to carry out their function of guidance and monitoring of management. 
They should act with integrity and be held accountable for their actions.
383 
 
The above guideline is self-explanatory. The board should have autonomy to act without 
undue influence of the state.
384
 The composition of the board should include non-
executive members to provide independent judgement and competent opinions to the 
board.
385
 The selection of the board members is very important and this should be done in 
a transparent manner to attract and appoint the best candidates.
386
The selection of suitable 
candidates helps build a strong board.
387
 It is also important that committees be set up to 
guide the board on issues, such as, audit, risk management, and remuneration.
388
 The 
committees should be independent.
389
 The committees make it easy for the board to 
perform its functions which include, among others, managing risk and giving strategic 
advice to management.
390
 
 
The OECD Guidelines are tailored to provide a model for the corporate governance 
regime of SOEs. The guidelines, if adopted, provide a very good model which ensures 
profitable management of a SOE. It is noted that in some cases the guidelines have 
loopholes which require bolstering, such as, regarding relations with stakeholders and 
transparency and disclosure. However on the whole they are quite comprehensive. 
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3.5 An Overview of the Corporate Governance Framework for SOEs in Norway 
 
The OECD Guidelines discussed above underscore the need for a corporate governance 
framework dedicated to SOEs. The corporate governance framework for SOEs in 
Norway has been reduced into administrative policies for the ministry in charge of state 
ownership in Norway.
391
These policies were made subsequent to a Government White 
Paper
392
 which identified the 10 major principles on which administration of state 
ownership in individual companies should be based.
393
The principles,
394
 together with 
other materials form the core of these policies. The principles are discussed below. 
 
3.5.1 All Shareholders shall be Treated Equally.
395
 
 
This is quite similar to the OECD Principles and Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
elaborated above.
396
 Equitable treatment of shareholders is a basic tenet of corporate 
governance. As explained above, this involves the treatment of all shareholders with the 
same class of shares equally, and equal treatment in the distribution of material 
information to the shareholders.
397
 Minority shareholders and foreign shareholders should 
not be discriminated against.
398
 The requirement of equal treatment of shareholders is 
also reiterated in the Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 2009.
399
  
 
3.5.2 There shall be Transparency in the State’s Ownership of Companies.400 
 
This is also discussed in the OECD Guidelines examined in the preceding section.
401
 
Transparency, as explained above, relates to the use of sound accounting methods and 
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conducting of internal and external audits, as well as availing financial information and 
management to the various stakeholders.
402
 Financial reports and documents that are 
generated after audits should be accurate to provide a clear unbiased picture to interested 
parties.
403
 In light of the foregoing discussion, it is worth noting that the state 
(Department of Ownership) publishes an Annual Ownership Report, with results of the 
State Owned Companies and the names of members of the different boards of 
directors.
404
 
 
3.5.3 Ownership Decisions and Resolutions shall be made at the General Meeting.
405
 
 
This Principle underscores the fact that protection of shareholders interest is very 
important.
406
 It also relates to the foregoing principle on transparency. The Code provides 
that steps should be taken to ensure that the majority of shareholders attend the general 
meeting.
407
 The board can ensure that a general meeting is attended by giving the 
committee members sufficient details and timely notice of the meeting.
408
 
 
3.5.4 The State may set Performance Targets for Each Company Together with 
other Owners. The Board is Responsible for Meeting these Targets.
409
 
 
The state is enjoined to ensure that companies remain relevant to the objectives for which 
they were established. To this end, performance targets serve as a very important tool for 
measuring relevance and whether the different companies are meeting the goals and 
objectives for which they were established. The board which is in charge of day-to-day 
supervision of the management of the company is in position to ensure that the targets are 
met. The state is able to monitor the different companies through their performance 
targets. 
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3.5.5 The Capital Structure of the Company shall be Consistent with the Objective 
of the Ownership and the Company's Situation.
410
 
 
Related to the foregoing Principle, performance targets help highlight the company‘s 
situation and whether the company is meeting its objectives. Thus pegging capital 
structure against its objectives and its situation ensures that the company delivers and 
motivates the board of the company to perform. 
 
3.5.6 The Composition of the Board shall be Characterised by Competence, 
Capacity and Diversity and shall Reflect the Distinctive Characteristics of Each 
Company.
411
 
 
The OECD Guidelines discussed above provide for the responsibilities of the board and 
also highlight the necessity of a competent board.
412
 It is interesting to note that the 
competence of the board is also discussed in the Norwegian Code. As discussed earlier, 
the importance of the board cannot be understated.
413
 It has been noted that Norwegian 
SOE boards have the overall responsibility for decisions of a commercial nature, 
including long-term strategic planning and budget supervision.
414
Thus the competence of 
the board cannot be compromised.
415
 It has also been highlighted that the ministry in 
charge of SOEs participates in the nomination of board members as part of the 
nomination committee which is elected by the Annual General Assembly.
416
 The main 
task of the nomination committee is to find qualified persons with varied experience in 
the field in which they operate.
417
 Thus this complements the above Principle. 
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3.5.7 Compensation and Incentive Systems shall Promote the Creation of Value in 
the Companies and shall be Generally Regarded as Reasonable.
418
 
 
The above Principle relates to regulation of the remuneration of board members. While 
board members should be allowed to receive reasonable remuneration, there should be a 
separate committee of the board, comprised of non-executive directors, which determines 
matters to do with remuneration.
419
 The remuneration should be such as to motivate the 
directors and encourage them to comfortably perform their duties. The above Principle is 
in line with the OECD Principles which indicate that there is a link between performance 
and remuneration.
420
 
 
3.5.8 The Board shall Exercise an Independent Control of the Company’s 
Management on Behalf of the Owners.
421
 
 
The board is the company organ at the core of the daily running of any company.
422
 
Management interacts more with the board than with the shareholders or owners. Thus, 
for the board to effectively perform its role, it should be able to do so with minimal 
interruption of its mandate. The state as a shareholder or an owner of a SOE is bound to 
interfere with the running of the entity. This should be discouraged as it affects the 
running of the company. In Norway, line ministry officials, Members of Parliament, 
Ministers and State Secretaries are not allowed to sit on the board of directors of any 
SOE.
423
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3.5.9 The Board shall Adopt a Plan for its Own Work and shall Work Actively with 
Development of its Own Competence. The Board’s Activities shall be Assessed.424 
 
Similar to the above Principle at 3.5.3, which requires the state to set performance targets 
for each company. The board of directors is also enjoined to adopt a plan for its own 
work. Naturally, the plan of work should be consistent with the performance targets 
enshrined in the above mentioned Principle. Sufficient diligence should be undertaken in 
the selection of board members; this will decrease the burden of development of 
competence.
425
 Norway has institutions in place which ensure the selection of the most 
competent board members.
426
 The existence of a Nominations committee elected at the 
Annual General Meeting ensures that qualified board members are selected.
427
  
 
3.5.10 The Company shall Recognise its Responsibilities to all Shareholders and 
Stakeholders in the Company.
428
 
 
This Principle attempts to cover all bases. Companies ought to benefit the shareholders 
who are their main benefactors; to this end they have an obligation to the shareholders. 
On the other hand, the contribution of stakeholders is not as explicit, save for employees 
who work in the company. Thus the responsibilities to the stakeholders are often ignored. 
There is a need to borrow from the OECD Guidelines and protect the stakeholders‘ rights 
by demanding that companies publish reports on their relationships with stakeholders.
429
 
This helps the stakeholders to keep track of the company‘s performance. It is worth 
noting that this Principle is in tandem with the OECD Guidelines on relations with 
stakeholders, which enjoin the state and state-owned enterprises to recognise 
responsibilities to stakeholders. As suggested earlier,
430
 both the OECD guidelines and 
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the Norwegian Principles of corporate governance for SOEs, have to bolster the 
protection of stakeholders. 
  
The Principles elucidated in this section underpin the Norwegian corporate governance 
framework for SOEs. The Principles are in very many ways similar to the OECD 
Guidelines discussed in the preceding section. The fact that Norway is one of the OECD 
countries is a plausible reason to explain the similarity. The Principles discussed in this 
section just like the OECD principles concentrate on shareholders as opposed to 
stakeholders, yet they deal with SOEs. There is need to involve and cater for 
stakeholders‘ interests in policies related to SOEs.  
 
3.6 An Overview of the Corporate Governance Framework for SOEs in Uganda; 
Proposals for Reform 
 
Uganda does not have a distinct corporate governance framework dedicated to SOEs, as 
exists in Norway. Prior to the Companies Bill 2009, corporate governance matters were 
to a large extent a preserve of financial institutions and listed companies.
431
 This reason 
and the fact that the Companies Act Cap 110 has no corporate governance code, make the 
examination of corporate governance using the Companies Act Cap 110 complicated. 
The Companies Bill 2009 attempts to introduce the concept of corporate governance in 
all companies and not just the entities mentioned above. Thus the Corporate Governance 
Code that is annexed to the Companies Bill in the Second Schedule (table F) is the most 
appropriate instrument to be used in examining the corporate governance framework for 
SOEs in Uganda. It should be noted that SOEs are comprised of various entities and most 
of these are not listed companies. On 18 November 2009, the first reading of the 
Companies Bill 2009 took place, whereupon it was referred to the relevant parliamentary 
committee for scrutiny.
432
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Section 14 of the Companies Bill provides as follows: 
 
(1). A public company shall at the time of registration of its articles and memorandum of 
association or subsequently, adopt and incorporate into its articles all or any part of the 
provisions of the code of good corporate governance contained in table F set out in the 
2
nd
 Schedule. 
(2). A private company may at the time of registration of its articles or subsequently, 
adopt and incorporate into its articles all or any of the provisions of the code of good 
corporate governance contained in table F. 
(3). Where a company adopts all or any part of the codes in table F, a printed copy of that 
table shall be annexed to or incorporated in each copy of its articles of association. 
 
It is worth noting that the section does not distinguish between SOEs and other 
companies; thus the Codes are meant to apply across the board, ignoring the unique 
structure of SOEs.  
 
These Principles are also optional for private companies and may be adopted at the 
instance of the company. In light of the foregoing lacuna, Uganda should adopt the 
approach of ‗apply or explain‘ which is used in the King III Report on corporate 
governance.
433
 The language used in the Companies Bill 2009 does not denote any 
intention to seriously engage with corporate governance issues in Uganda. 
 
The Corporate Governance Code has nine principles. Some of the principles that have a 
strong bearing on SOEs are discussed below. 
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3.6.1 Board and Directors
434
 
 
This is a very broad principle touching on quite a number of board matters. These 
include: the responsibilities and powers of the board, board composition, remuneration of 
directors, the necessity for board committees, and board and director evaluation.
435
 The 
board is enjoined to act in good faith and is accountable for the performance of the 
company.
436
 
 
Additionally, the board is supposed to provide strategic direction, retain full and effective 
control, identify and monitor key performance areas, and create a board charter.
437
 All 
these responsibilities and powers are relevant for both SOEs and other corporations. 
However, it may be easy for the boards of non-SOE corporations to fulfil these 
responsibilities, as opposed to SOEs which are encumbered with state interference. 
Responsibilities, such as, providing strategic direction and retaining full and effective 
control, need to be strengthened for SOEs so that the line ministries and other 
government regulatory bodies do not by-pass these provisos to hijack the powers of the 
board.  
 
The Code provides that the board is to be composed of both executive and non-executive 
directors.
438
 Further, that the board should have a majority of non-executive directors and 
these are supposed to be independent.
439
The principles on board composition, contained 
in the Code, are quite comprehensive for both SOEs and other corporations. The Code is 
however silent on whether government officials can be members of boards of SOEs. This 
is very significant in ensuring the independence of the board of an SOE. Uganda should 
borrow from Norway‘s SOE corporate governance framework, which prohibits Ministers, 
Members of Parliament and State Secretaries from sitting on SOE boards.
440
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Remuneration of directors is also addressed by the Code.
441
It is important to pay directors 
reasonably well so that the company can attract and maintain qualified persons to guide 
the company.
442
 The Code recommends that the board should have a remuneration 
committee made up of non-executive directors to determine executive directors‘ 
payments.
443The issue of directors‘ remuneration is also discussed in the Norwegian 
Principles on Corporate Governance for SOEs. It is very important that directors of SOEs 
are not paid from government coffers or from the national budget as this will compromise 
their independence. 
 
The Code also provides for board committees.
444
Companies are encouraged to have at 
least an audit committee and a remuneration committee, headed by non-executive 
directors.
445
 These committees are supposed to obtain full information from the board and 
they should be independent.
446
 This is an interesting provision in light of the requirements 
for SOEs in Uganda to be subject to audits by the Office of the Auditor-General.
447
 To 
enhance the existing legal regime, it is important that SOE audit committees be required 
to furnish an annual report to the Office of the Auditor-General; this will amplify the 
effect of audits of SOEs.  
 
Board and director evaluation is another tenet covered by the Code.
448
Companies should 
ensure that their boards evaluate their performance. This may be done through board 
committees.
449
 The evaluation suggested is self-evaluation by the directors.
450
The 
evaluation suggested should be done once a year.
451
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Directors duties suggested in the code are quite timely; very many SOEs in Uganda have 
been operating without boards. Additionally, some of the SOEs with boards have been 
operating in utter disregard of good corporate practice.
452
 The Table below (Table 3.2) 
reflects the state in which some SOEs operate in Uganda. 
 
Table 3.2 
Status and Operation of Boards of Directors for Select SOEs in Uganda 
Uganda National Council of Science and 
Technology 
Absence of board of directors 
Uganda Air Cargo Corporation Absence of board of directors 
Uganda Broadcasting Corporation No approval of board remuneration 
National Enterprise Corporation Absence of board of directors 
Mandela National Stadium Unsigned board minutes 
Kilembe Mines Ltd Absence of board of directors 
Civil Aviation Authority Absence of board of directors 
Source: See below
453
 
 
The number of SOEs represented above is small compared to the total number of SOEs in 
Uganda; nevertheless it points to the adverse effects of managing SOEs without a 
corporate governance framework in place.  
 
3.6.2 Risk Management
454
 
 
Under the Code, the board should be responsible for the total process of risk management 
in a corporation.
455
 Management should assist the board in this regard.
456
 The board 
working together with management should set risk management policies and should 
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ensure that these are communicated to the employees and implemented.
457
 Risk 
management should be undertaken by a special board committee.
458
  
 
Further, risk should be monitored in a continuous manner and management should report 
to the board on risk.
459
 Key risk areas should be identified by the board.
460
 Controls 
should be put in place to respond to risk and protect stakeholders.
461
 The board should 
also disclose that it is in charge of risk management.
462
Commentators, such as David M 
Walker, have emphasised the role that the board has to play in averting and controlling 
risk in a company.
463
 
 
Risk management for SOEs is more involved than that of other business entities because 
of the players involved. The state will always seek to interfere in risk control in SOEs. 
This makes the SOE boards reluctant to address risk situations as they are aware that the 
state will bail them out. It is important that the state distance itself from risk management 
in SOEs for optimal performance of the risk management function by the board. In 
Norway the board is in charge of creating its own plan of work.
464
 This also involves 
creating strategies to combat risk. 
 
3.6.3 Relations with Shareholders
465
 
 
The Code also deals with relations with shareholders.
466
The Code provides for: dialogue 
with institutional investors to understand objectives, timely and detailed notices for 
general meetings, as well as the use of voting at general meetings to arrive at a consensus 
on contentious issues.
467
 This Principle is devoid of detail and ignores issues, such as, 
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equitable treatment of shareholders.
468
 It actually focuses on institutional investors as 
opposed to all shareholders. The equitable treatment of shareholders is of particular 
importance to SOEs as they have the state as a shareholder. The state often uses its 
special status to prevail over the board and to dictate company policy. It is therefore 
important that the Code provide for equal treatment of all shareholders. The Principle 
does not provide for companies‘ responsibilities to stakeholders and for the treatment of 
stakeholders. This is important for SOEs as they have numerous stakeholders. The 
Ugandan Code provides a very narrow conceptualization of the relations with 
shareholders, compared to the OECD principles and the corporate governance framework 
of Norway. 
 
The Companies Bill 2009 and the Corporate Governance Code annexed thereto should be 
re-visited to provide for SOEs and to address the corporate governance needs of SOEs. 
Important issues that are addressed in the corporate governance framework of SOEs in 
Norway, such as, transparency in state ownership and aligning the capital structure of the 
corporation to the objectives, should be addressed. The Ugandan Code is clearly not 
meant for SOEs. In lieu of redefining the Code along the terms suggested above, a 
separate Code for SOEs should be created to address the corporate governance needs of 
SOEs. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out to engage with the following issues: the concept of corporate 
governance, theories of corporate governance, and the relationship between corporate 
governance and public governance among others. The OECD Principles and Guidelines 
of Corporate Governance were used as a benchmark to evaluate the corporate governance 
framework of Norway and Uganda. A comparison of the corporate governance of SOEs 
in Norway and Uganda was also undertaken. 
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The chapter has shown that there are many definitions of corporate governance. These 
definitions have a link to the difference in opinion regarding the origin of the concept of 
corporate governance. The definitions also have a direct relationship with the theories of 
corporate governance. The stakeholder theory of corporate governance stands out as the 
most relevant theory with regard to the corporate governance framework for SOEs. It 
takes into account the fact that SOEs have numerous players. The Agency theory, on the 
other hand, is limited to the shareholder and director relationship and ignores the various 
stakeholders associated with SOEs. Suffice it to note, that from a legal perspective, it 
appears to be resting on uneven ground.  
 
The chapter has also underscored the close relationship between corporate governance 
and public governance. The public governance environment has to be conducive for the 
germination and nurturing of good corporate governance principles. This is evident in 
Norway as shown by the worldwide governance indicators. 
 
The OECD Principles and Guidelines on Corporate Governance were used as a criterion 
for best practice against which the corporate governance frameworks in Norway and 
Uganda were evaluated. The corporate governance framework in Norway is quite similar 
to the OECD Principles and Guidelines. Norway has also developed a comprehensive 
corporate governance framework for SOEs. The similarity can be explained by the fact 
that Norway is one of the OECD countries. It has however been noted that the Norwegian 
corporate governance framework does not give sufficient coverage to stakeholders and 
this should be addressed. 
 
Currently, Uganda does not have a corporate governance framework that applies to all 
companies. Corporate governance has been left to listed companies and financial 
institutions. The Companies Bill 2009 which is before Parliament intends to rectify this 
anomaly. The Companies Bill 2009 provides for a Code on corporate governance. The 
Code is however best suited for other companies as opposed to SOEs. The Code is not 
alive to SOE corporate governance needs. Thus there is a need to redesign the code or to 
put in place a special Code for SOEs. 
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It is very difficult for Ugandan SOEs to perform optimally if there is no corporate 
governance framework within which they can be protected against undue influence by the 
state. There is a need for corporate governance structures to insulate SOEs from 
unhealthy corporate practices and to prepare them for privatisation where necessary. 
Against this background, the success of the proposed NOC greatly depends on steps 
being taken to provide corporate governance structures for SOEs in the Ugandan legal 
regime. 
 
The next chapter discusses corporate governance structures in the Norwegian State Oil 
Company and seeks to elicit lessons for the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN THE NORWEGIAN 
STATE OIL COMPANY (STATOIL); LESSONS FOR THE PROPOSED 
NATIONAL OIL COMPANY OF UGANDA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the corporate governance framework of the Norwegian State Oil 
Company and extracts lessons for the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda. It 
reduces the corporate governance discourse presented in chapter 3 to National Oil 
Companies (NOCs). Before delving into the corporate governance debate, it is imperative 
to take a trip down history lane and trace the growth of the Norwegian State Oil 
Company, also known as Statoil. 
 
Norway had the advantage of starting its oil industry against the backdrop of a highly 
competent bureaucracy that was skilled in, among other things, regulation of natural 
resource industries, like hydropower and mining.
469
It should also be noted that Norway‘s 
policy goal was geared towards maintaining control over the oil sector and not revenue 
maximization.
470
 The country was greatly concerned with the negative effects of oil 
wealth; it was believed that a NOC would regulate the pace of the development of the oil 
industry and protect the economy from the black gold curse.
471
 
 
The Norwegian State Oil Company was established by a decision of the Norwegian 
Parliament in 1972.
472
The company‘s role was to manage the commercial interest of the 
government in the development of the oil and gas industry in Norway.
473
The company 
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has grown with the Norwegian oil and gas industry.
474
Statoil was the first Norwegian 
company to be given operator responsibility for an oil field in Norway.
475
 Statoil has 
continued to grow and in 2001 it was partially privatized.
476
 The Figure below (Figure 
4.1) represents the milestones in the history of the Norwegian State Oil Company. 
                                                 
474
 History of Statoil See http://www.statoil.com/en/About/History/Pages/default3.aspx (accessed on 3 
March 2011) 
475
 History of Statoil See http://www.statoil.com/en/About/History/Pages/default3.aspx (accessed on 3 
March 2011) 
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Figure 4.1 
Major Milestones in the History of the Norwegian State Oil Company (Statoil) 
 
Source: See below
477  
                                                 
477
 Forty Years of Norwegian Oil See: 
 http://www.statoil.com/en/about/history/oilnorway40years/pages/default.aspx (accessed on 3 March 2011) 
*The alliance established some significant international operations, e.g. Angola. **The name was later 
changed back to Statoil in 2009. 
 
1972 
 
Statoil 
was 
formed. 
1973 
 
Statoil was 
awarded 
blocks 1/9 
Tommeliten. 
1978 
 
Statoil made a major 
discovery in the North Sea. 
1979 
 
Statoil 
discovered 
the silver 
block 30/6. 
1987 
 
Statoil took over the 
statfjord operatorship 
from Mobil. 
 
1993 
 
Statoil  
acquired  
BP‘s  
240 service 
stations in 
Sweden. 
Statoil 
formed 
an alliance 
with BP 
between 
1990 and  
1999.* 
 
 
 
1996 
 
Statoil took 
over as 
production 
operator for 
Troll Gas. 
1997 
 
Statoil cancelled celebrations to 
mark its 25
th
 anniversary due to the 
deaths of its employees. 
 
2001 
 
Statoil was 
partially 
privatized  
and listed 
on the Oslo 
and New 
York stock 
exchanges. 
2007 
 
Statoil 
Hydro** 
was 
created 
after the 
merger 
between 
Statoil 
and 
Hydro 
Oil and 
Energy.  
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It is interesting to note that even prior to its partial privatization in 2001, the company 
was making major oil discoveries and expanding business. Additionally, the company‘s 
loyalty to its stakeholders is clearly depicted by the 1997 incident which led to the 
cancellation of the anniversary celebrations. 
 
Partial privatization is bound to open up the company to more business opportunities, as 
demonstrated by the merger with Hydro Oil and Energy in 2007. However, it took 29 
years before the company could be partially privatized. There was ample time for the 
state to nurture the company and the industry.
478
  
 
4.2 Company Organs and Corporate Governance in Statoil 
 
Statoil is organized under the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act No. 45 
of 13 June 1997. The Act applies to public limited liability companies. These are 
companies where none of the members have personal liability for the obligations of the 
company, the company is designated a public limited company in its Articles of 
Association, and it is registered as a Public limited company in the Register of Business 
Enterprises.
479
 
 
Norwegian company law provides for the following organs of the company: the general 
meeting,
480
 the board of directors,
481
 the corporate assembly,
482
 the nomination 
committee,
483
 and board committees, e.g. the audit committee.
484
 These organs are all 
present in the Norwegian State Oil Company.
485
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4.2.1 Shareholders in General Meeting 
 
The shareholders in general meeting are said to exercise supreme authority in the 
company.
486
 Be that as it may, the powers of the shareholders are guided by the law. For 
example, resolutions of the corporate assembly and the board of directors under section 
6-37 may not be reviewed by the general meeting except where the King grants 
individual exceptions.
487
Companies in Norway are bound by law to hold an ordinary 
general meeting within six months from the end of each financial year.
488
 This meeting 
deals with adoption of the annual financial statement and annual report, fixing 
remuneration for directors and other senior executives, the distribution of dividends, as 
well as other matters which by law or the Articles of Association pertain to the general 
meeting.
489
 Additionally, the board of directors, corporate assembly or chairman of the 
corporate assembly may decide to call an extraordinary general meeting.
490
  
 
In line with the corporate governance framework of companies with state ownership, all 
shareholders have to be treated equally, as discussed above.
491
Additionally, all owner 
decisions and formal resolutions have to be made at the general meeting.
492
 
 
Statoil‘s Articles of Association and the above provisions of the Norwegian Public 
Limited Liability Act provide for the functions of the general meeting.
493
 Article 9 of the 
company‘s Articles of Association provides the following as the major functions of the 
general meeting. 
 
The annual general meeting shall address and decide the following matters:  
1. Adoption of the annual report and accounts, including the declaration of dividends.  
                                                 
486
 Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act Section 5-1(1) 
487
 Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act Section 5-1(2) 
488
 Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act Section 5-6(1) 
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490
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Annual General Meeting Statoil 
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2. Any other matters which are referred to the annual general meeting by statute law or 
the articles of association.
494
 
 
This broad mandate is supplemented by other functions provided in the Articles of 
Association, such as, making decisions on marketing and sale of petroleum,
495
 deciding 
on remuneration of members of the nomination committee,
496
 and election of shareholder 
elected members to the corporate assembly.
497
Statoil has one class of shares and all 
shareholders enjoy an equal right to vote at the general meeting.
498
 The Norwegian state 
holds 67% of the shares in the company.
499
 Despite its status as the state and majority 
shareholder, it is committed to good corporate governance.
500
 
 
4.2.2 Board of Directors 
 
Section 6-1 of the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act provides for the 
election of members of the board. Where the company has a corporate assembly, the 
company should have at least five board members.
501
As mentioned above, Statoil has a 
corporate assembly; thus it cannot have less than five board members.
502
 The board of 
directors may be elected by the shareholders in general meeting, the employees of the 
company under section 6-4, or the corporate assembly under section 6-37.
503
The 
                                                 
494
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 See:http://www.statoil.com/en/about/corporategovernance/articlesofassociation/pages/default.aspx 
(accessed on 7 March 2011) 
495
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497
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498
 Shareholders in Statoil See: 
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499
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500
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remuneration of members of the board of directors is fixed by the general meeting.
504
 The 
law also provides for gender equality in representation on the board of directors.
505
The 
board of directors in Norway is vested with the responsibility of managing the 
company.
506
 This includes organizing the business and drawing up plans and budgets for 
the business among others.
507
 The board is also vested with supervisory responsibility, 
that is, supervising day-to-day management.
508
 Additionally, the board represents the 
company in its dealings with external parties and has the powers to sign on behalf of and 
bind the company.
509
 
 
The board is encouraged to help set and achieve performance targets for the company, 
develop a plan for its work, and exercise independent control of management.
510
The 
corporate governance framework for State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) thus requires that 
the board be composed of competent people.
511
 This is necessary in light of the onerous 
tasks the board has to perform. The corporate governance principles for companies with 
state ownership also require that the company take note of its responsibilities to society at 
large.
512
Thus the board in the performance of its duties and management of the company 
should take note of the different stakeholders. 
 
Broadly, the Statoil board is in charge of managing and supervising the daily operations 
of the company.
 513
 The mandate of the board of Statoil is founded on legislation and the 
rules of procedure for the board.
514
 The rules of procedure detail the following as the 
basis for the Statoil board mandate: 
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The rights and obligations of the board of directors are listed in the Norwegian 
companies‘ legislation, the Norwegian Accounting Act and the Norwegian Stock 
Exchange Act, the company‘s articles of association, the decisions of the annual general 
meeting, these instructions for the board of directors and decisions otherwise adopted at 
the board meetings.
515
 
 
The board of Statoil is subjected to quite a large amount of regulation. This may suffocate 
the board and limit its creativity. On the other hand, it can be argued that these 
regulations have kept Statoil on the straight and narrow to good corporate governance. 
 
4.2.3 Corporate Assembly 
 
Section 6-35 of the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act provides that 
where a company has more than 200 employees, it has to provide for the election of a 
corporate assembly. The corporate assembly should have at least 12 members, but the 
number of members should be divisible by 3.
516
The election of two thirds of the 
corporate assembly may be undertaken by the general assembly or the employees.
517
 
Directors cannot be members of the corporate assembly unless an exception is made by 
the King.
518
 The corporate assembly mainly deals with the election of directors and the 
chairman of the board by employees.
519
 The corporate assembly also supervises the board 
of directors and the general manager‘s administration of the company.520This supervision 
is necessary in view of the numerous duties that the board has to perform. 
 
                                                 
515
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section 6-23 of the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act. They apply to companies which 
have employees represented on the board.) 
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Statoil has a corporate assembly composed of members elected by the general meeting 
and others elected from and by the employees.
521
 The major functions of the corporate 
assembly in Statoil are stated as follows: 
 
The most important duties of the corporate assembly are to elect the board of directors, to 
oversee the board and CEO‘s management of the company, to make decisions on 
investments of considerable magnitude in relation to the company‘s resources and to 
make decisions involving the rationalisation or reorganisation of operations that will 
entail major changes in or reallocation of the workforce.
522
 
 
The corporate assembly makes decisions on the matters stated above after receiving 
proposals from the board of directors. The corporate assembly is mainly focused on the 
interests of employees, and to this end takes care of the interests of stakeholders. 
 
4.2.4 Nomination Committee 
 
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance provides for a nomination 
committee. The general meeting is enjoined to elect the chairperson of the committee.
523
 
The Code further provides that the nomination committee should be provided for in the 
company‘s Articles of Association.524 The nomination committee is independent of both 
the board and management of the company.
525
 The committee should be selected to take 
into account the interests of all shareholders.
526
 The main duty of the nomination 
committee is to propose candidates for election to the corporate assembly and the board 
                                                 
521
Corporate Assembly 
See:http://www.statoil.com/en/About/CorporateGovernance/GoverningBodies/CorporateAssembly/Pages/d
efault.aspx (accessed on 8 March 2011) 
522
Corporate Assembly 
See:http://www.statoil.com/en/About/CorporateGovernance/GoverningBodies/CorporateAssembly/Pages/d
efault.aspx (accessed on 8 March 2011) 
523
 The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance principle 7 
524
 The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance principle 7 
525
Nomination Committee 
See:http://www.statoil.com/en/About/CorporateGovernance/GoverningBodies/ElectionCommittee/Pages/d
efault.aspx (accessed on 8 March 2011) and The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
principle 7 and 8 
526
 The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance principle 7 
 
 
 
 
99 
 
of directors.
527
 It also helps to determine the remuneration of the members of these 
bodies.
528
 
 
Members of the Statoil nomination committee serve a term of two years.
529
The duties of 
the Statoil nomination committee are detailed below:
530
 
 
1. To present a recommendation to the AGM regarding the election of shareholder elected 
members to the corporate assembly.  
2. To present a recommendation to the corporate assembly regarding the election of 
shareholder elected members to the board of directors.  
3. To present a proposal for the remuneration of members of the board of directors and the 
corporate assembly. 
 
The nomination committee leans more towards assisting shareholders. The Statoil 
nomination Committee is elected in terms of article 11 of its Articles of Association.
531
 
 
4.2.5 Audit Committee  
 
The audit committee is one of the committees established by the board. The audit 
committee is a creature of section 6-41 of the Norwegian Public Limited Liability 
Companies Act. The committee is mandatory for all companies with securities listed on a 
regulated market.
532
The committee is elected from the board members.
533
 One of the 
members of the committee should not be a company employee, but should be competent 
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in accounting or auditing.
534
 Section 6-43
535
 provides for the tasks of the audit committee, 
and these include: 
 
(a) Prepare the follow-up of the financial reporting process for the board of directors. 
(b) Monitor the systems for internal control and risk management including the internal 
audit of the company to the extent such function is established. 
(c) Have continuous contact with the appointed auditor of the company regarding the 
auditing of the annual accounts. 
(d) Review and monitor the independence of the auditor, cf. the Auditing Act chapter 4, 
including in particular to which extent other services than audit services having been 
rendered by the auditor or the audit firm represents a threat against the independence of 
the auditor. 
 
The corporate governance framework for SOEs in Norway requires that there must be 
transparency in the company.
536
 As discussed earlier, ensuring transparency is a duty 
which squarely falls on the shoulders of the auditors and accountants, as they generate 
financial reports which are relied upon by interested parties. Thus the audit committee 
which monitors the company auditors should take note of this mandate. 
 
The main duty of the Statoil audit committee is to keep in contact with the auditors of 
Statoil concerning auditing of the company‘s accounts.537 The committee also supervises 
compliance with the company‘s ethical guidelines on financial reporting.538 
 
The Figure below (Figure 4.2) represents the hierarchy of the different organs of Statoil 
and the linkages between them. 
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Figure 4.2 
Company Organs in Statoil 
 
Source: See below
539
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4.2.6 Statoil’s Corporate Governance Principles 
 
The principles upon which the corporate governance framework of the company is based 
are quite few. However, that does not jeopardize the corporate governance framework of 
the company, because corporate legislation and the broad corporate governance 
framework for SOEs in Norway
540
 cover all stops. This is evident in the discussion in 
chapter 3. The major principles are:
541
 
1. All shareholders will be treated equally  
2. Statoil will ensure that all shareholders have access to up-to-date, reliable and 
relevant information about the company‘s activities  
3. Statoil will have a board of directors that is independent of the group‘s management. 
In accordance with our ethical guidelines, the board focuses on there not being any 
conflicts of interest between owners, the board of directors and the company‘s 
management.  
4. The board of directors will base its practical work on the principles for good 
corporate governance applicable at all times. 
In addition to the above principles, the company as a listed entity has endorsed the 
Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance.
542
  The Statoil corporate 
governance principles are in line with the broad principles for corporate governance in 
SOEs in Norway. 
The Statoil company organs are quite elaborate and interrelated. The bodies work 
together and there is ample supervision. This may create duplication of roles and may be 
costly to maintain. However the basic roles of the different organs provide very good 
examples for organization of a company. The oversight functions of the corporate 
assembly and the nomination committee rein in the board of directors. As is apparent 
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from the above discussion, all the organs of the company are in accordance with 
Norwegian corporate law. The organization of the company and the strict compliance 
with the law are strong indications of the company‘s commitment to good corporate 
governance. The different company organs and the Statoil corporate governance 
principles are in sync with the corporate governance framework for SOEs in Norway. 
 
4.3 Corporate Structure for the Proposed National Oil Company of Uganda 
 
The Petroleum Bill 2010 provides for the creation of a National Oil Company in 
Uganda.
543
The Bill does not provide for any corporate governance framework nor does it 
detail the corporate structure of the NOC. This section provides a structure for the NOC 
modelled on the corporate structure of Statoil but with special regard to Ugandan 
legislation. 
 
4.3.1 Shareholders in General Meeting 
 
The Petroleum Bill 2010 provides that the NOC shall be established under the Companies 
Act.
544
The Companies Act of Uganda Cap 110 provides that registered companies should 
hold an annual general meeting in addition to other meetings.
545
 The notices should 
specify the meeting as such. The Companies Act provides as follows: 
 
Every company shall in each year hold a general meeting as its annual general meeting in 
addition to any other meetings in that year, and shall specify the meeting as such in the 
notices calling it; and not more than fifteen months shall elapse between the date of one 
annual general meeting of a company and that of the next; except that so long as a 
company holds its first annual general meeting within eighteen months of its 
incorporation, it need not hold it in the year of its incorporation or in the following year. 
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If default is made in holding a meeting of the company in accordance with subsection (1), 
the registrar may, on the application of any member of the company, call or direct the 
calling of a general meeting of the company and give such ancillary or consequential 
directions as the registrar thinks expedient, including directions modifying or 
supplementing, in relation to the calling, holding and conducting of the meeting, the 
operation of the company‘s articles; and it is declared that the directions that may be 
given under this subsection include a direction that one member of the company present 
in person or by proxy shall be deemed to constitute a meeting. 
 
A general meeting held under subsection (2) shall, subject to any directions of the 
registrar, be deemed to be an annual general meeting of the company; but, where a 
meeting so held is not held in the year in which the default in holding the company‘s 
annual general meeting occurred, the meeting so held shall not be treated as the annual 
general meeting for the year in which it is held unless at that meeting the company 
resolves that it shall be so treated. 
 
In Uganda, public companies limited by shares may adopt the template for Articles of 
Association, referred to as Table A.
546
 This Table provides for the details regarding 
general meetings. A general meeting cannot commence unless a quorum is present.
547
 
Further, the general meeting deals with very important matters, such as, the election of 
directors
548
 and dealing with reports of the auditors and accountants.
549
 In Uganda, the 
shareholders in general meeting perform duties dictated by the Companies Act and the 
Articles of Association. Thus the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda is enjoined 
under the law to hold general meetings. This is a platform for shareholders to perform 
their duties. The general meeting retains ultimate control of the company.
550
 
 
Currently, the general meeting in Uganda, unlike in Norway performs its duties 
independently. There is no corporate assembly, nor a nomination committee to assist the 
shareholders. The Companies Bill 2009 and the Corporate Governance Code have 
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 The Companies Act Cap 110 Section 10 
547
 The Companies Act Table A 
548
 The Companies Act Cap 110 Section 184 
549
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550
 Gower L C B et al (1979) 152 
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introduced the concept of the nomination committee.
551
 However, the committee has a 
very limited mandate, which is primarily board evaluation.
552
 The absence of a 
nomination committee puts shareholders at risk. In situations where the shareholders are 
neither informed nor astute, they risk making erroneous decisions. There is need for the 
Companies Act to provide for a nomination committee similar to the nomination 
committee in Norway to assist shareholders especially in SOEs. 
 
4.3.2 Board of Directors 
 
Section 177 of the Companies Act Cap 110 provides that every company should have at 
least two directors.
553
 The directors form the board of directors. The directors are elected 
by the shareholders in general meeting.
554
Directors of public companies should be at least 
21 years old and should not exceed 70 years.
555
Undischarged bankrupts cannot be 
appointed directors.
556
 Directors are in charge of the management of the company and 
they perform their duties in terms of Table A, or the Articles of Association.
557
 Thus the 
board of directors is another body that has to be established for the proposed National Oil 
Company of Uganda. Table A provides the duties of directors, which include:  
 
The business of the company shall be managed by the directors, who may pay all 
expenses incurred in promoting and registering the company, and may exercise all such 
powers of the company as are not, by the Act or by these regulations, required to be 
exercised by the company in general meeting, subject, nevertheless, to any of these 
regulations, to the provisions of the Act and to such regulations, being not inconsistent 
with the aforesaid regulations or provisions, as may be prescribed by the company in 
general meeting, but no regulation made by the company in general meeting shall 
invalidate any prior act of the directors which would have been valid if that regulation 
had not been made. 
                                                 
551
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The board of directors in Uganda is not supervised by the corporate assembly. In lieu of 
that, the board of the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda should have a 
considerable number of competent non-executive directors, to create checks and balances 
and monitor the board. The Companies Bill 2009 and the Corporate Governance Code 
annexed thereto provide for executive and non-executive directors.
558
 This is an 
indication that Uganda is headed in the right direction. 
 
4.3.3 Audit Committee 
 
The Companies Act Cap 110 does not provide for audit committees. However, the 
Companies Bill 2009 and the Corporate Governance Code provide for audit 
committees.
559
Board committees under the Companies Bill 2009 are supposed to assist 
the board in the performance of its duties.
560
 The board remains responsible for its 
functions but may delegate to the committees. The Companies Bill 2009 provides that 
every company should at least have an audit committee and a remuneration committee; 
these should consist mainly of non-executive directors.
561
 As discussed above, the audit 
committee is responsible for supervising the company auditors. The audit committee 
should liaise with the office of the Auditor-General during the auditing process.
562
 
 
The Figure below (Figure 4.3) summarises the proposed board structure of the proposed 
NOC of Uganda. 
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Figure 4.3 
Proposed Company Organs of the Proposed National Oil Company of Uganda 
 
* The position of Managing Director is provided for in Table A of the Companies Act Cap 110 
Shareholders in General Meeting 
Board of Directors 
Nomination 
Committee 
 
External 
Auditor 
Audit Committee 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Managing Director* 
Internal  
Auditor 
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4.3.4 Corporate Governance Principles for the Proposed NOC of Uganda 
 
As indicated in chapter 1, section 1.1, the Petroleum Bill 2010 which provides for the 
proposed NOC, does not provide for any corporate governance structures.
563
 The 
Companies Act Cap 110 does not provide for a Corporate Governance Code.
564
 The 
Companies Bill 2009, which provides for a Corporate Governance Code, does not 
provide for substantive corporate governance structures for SOEs.
565
Thus the 
recommendation to amend the Corporate Governance Code to provide for SOEs or to 
formulate another Corporate Governance Code dedicated only to SOEs is very timely.
566
 
The Norwegian State Oil Company has its own corporate governance principles, in 
addition to the general corporate governance framework for SOEs in Norway.
567
 These 
principles supplement the broad corporate governance framework. Nonetheless, a broad 
corporate governance framework for SOEs is more important than a company specific 
corporate governance framework. The company specific corporate governance 
framework for the NOC can be created after the broad framework is in place. The 
emphasis should be on formulating a broad corporate governance framework, as 
discussed in chapter 3, section 3.6 above. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
The Norwegian State Oil Company made substantial progress prior to partial 
privatization. As noted above, the company expanded business prior to privatization in 
2001. Thus, even as a fully fledged SOE the company was making progress. The 
company has continued growing. The merger with Hydro Oil and Gas in 2007 is one of 
the developments that have emerged after privatisation. 
                                                 
563
 The Petroleum (Exploration, Development, Production, and Value Addition) Bill 2010 clause 42 
564
 Refer generally to chapter 1 and 3 of the thesis 
565
 Refer generally to chapter 1 and 3 of the thesis 
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 Refer generally to chapter 3, especially the conclusion 
567
 Refer to the discussion in subsection 4.2.6, of chapter 4 of the thesis 
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The general meeting of Statoil is supported by two organs: that is the nomination 
committee and the corporate assembly, which help the shareholders perform some of 
their duties, such as, election of directors, and also help keep the board in check. All 
major decisions of the company are performed by the general meeting. 
 
The board of directors is in charge of day to day operations of the company and 
supervision of management. The board is supervised by the corporate assembly. The 
board of Statoil is enjoined to consider the interests of other stakeholders in the company. 
 
The corporate assembly helps to ensure that the interests of the employees are catered for, 
by means of representation on the board of directors. The corporate assembly also helps 
supervise the board of directors. The corporate assembly also makes decisions on large 
investments. This organ highlights the extent to which stakeholders‘ interests in Statoil 
and Norway at large are valued. 
 
The nomination committee, as discussed above, assists the general meeting in the 
selection of directors and members of the corporate assembly; this is done through 
making recommendations of suitable members. This helps the general assembly make 
informed decisions. 
 
The audit committee supervises the auditors of the company, that is, the internal and 
external auditors. The committee is elected from the board of directors. The committee 
also ensures that company ethics are complied with and that the financial reports of the 
company are in order. 
 
The Norwegian State Oil Company is well organized with various organs which are 
interlinked. These organs exist against the backdrop of a comprehensive corporate 
governance framework for SOEs. The different organs support the general meeting and 
ensure the smooth running of the company. These organs are established by legislation. 
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The Petroleum Bill 2010 does not provide for a corporate structure for the proposed 
National Oil Company of Uganda. It only provides that the company will be established 
under the Companies Act Cap 110. The corporate structured proposed above is a 
reflection of the corporate structure of Statoil. It should be noted that the corporate 
structure is proposed against the background that Ugandan legislation is different. This is 
noted and catered for in the proposed reform. 
 
The general meeting is provided for in the Companies Act Cap 110; thus all companies 
registered under the Act have to provide for general meetings for the shareholders. This 
provides a forum for shareholders to make decisions affecting the company. Currently, 
Ugandan legislation does not provide for a nomination committee. This puts the 
shareholders at risk of making erroneous decisions. Thus it is proposed that the 
Companies Act be amended to provide for a nomination committee that can perform 
functions similar to those of the nomination committee in Norway; this will assist 
shareholders in general meeting. 
 
The board of directors is another organ that is established by the Companies Act Cap 110. 
The board of directors is charged with the supervision of management and monitors the 
day-to-day running of the company. Thus the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda 
has to provide for this organ. As noted above, Ugandan legislation does not provide for 
the corporate assembly to supervise the board. However, the Companies Bill provides 
that the board of a company should have executive and non-executive directors. The non-
executive directors can check the executive directors and perform some of the functions 
performed by the corporate assembly. 
 
The audit committee is another organ that has been created by the Companies Bill 2009. 
This committee supervises the auditors of the company. Given the unique structure of 
Ugandan legislation, which subjects SOEs to auditing by the office of the Auditor -
General, the audit committee of the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda should 
work closely with the Office of the Auditor-General. 
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The proposed National Oil Company of Uganda is a feasible proposal if the legislation 
establishing the company is buttressed with a worthwhile corporate governance 
framework. The Norwegian State Oil Company has been successful due to the corporate 
governance structures and the different organs which work very closely but 
independently. 
 
The next chapter examines recommendations for state intervention, corporate governance 
of SOEs generally, and the proposed NOC in Uganda in particular. These 
recommendations are drawn from the discussion generated in chapters 2 to 4. The chapter 
also provides the conclusion of the research. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter provides a conclusion and a summary of all the recommendations arising out 
of the substantive chapters, that is, chapters 2 to 4. It amalgamates all the 
recommendations therein, to provide a unified proposal on the way forward; that is, the 
inclusion of corporate governance in the discourse on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
and the proposed National Oil Company of Uganda. The recommendations are made 
against the background of the discussion of Norway and the Norwegian State Oil 
Company in the above-mentioned chapters.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
Corporate governance is very important in ensuring the profitable management of a 
corporation. This statement is of particular relevance to Uganda which has recently 
discovered commercially viable deposits of oil and which is in the process of enacting 
legislation to regulate the oil and gas industry. The legislation provides for the 
establishment of a National Oil Company. It is interesting to note that the legislation does 
not provide for any corporate governance structures for the proposed National Oil 
Company (NOC). Additionally, the Companies Act Cap 110, under which the NOC is 
supposed to be established, does not have a Corporate Governance Code. The Companies 
Bill 2009 which is currently before Parliament provides for a Code of Corporate 
Governance. However, the Code does not sufficiently provide for the corporate 
governance needs of State Owned Enterprises.  
 
Norway which has been very successful in the management of its oil and gas industry has 
done so through, among other institutions, a National Oil Company. The Norwegian State 
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Oil Company has been the beneficiary of good corporate governance structures in 
Norway. Against this background, this research has compared in the two countries, the 
concept of state intervention, SOEs and the Corporate Governance framework for SOEs. 
The corporate governance structures of the Norwegian State Oil Company have also been 
examined and a corporate governance structure for the proposed National Oil Company 
of Uganda has been advanced.  
 
The broad comparison indicates that state intervention in the economy is justified in some 
key sectors, such as the oil and gas industry. This is evident from the early involvement 
of the state in the management of oil in Norway. The involvement of the state should be 
born out of a deliberate economic policy and not as a crisis management tool. Uganda 
should not shy away from involving the state in the management of this important natural 
resource if it can work towards improving the governance framework at both the public 
sector level and the corporate level. 
 
The research also shows that SOEs exist in key sectors of state economies. This allows 
the state to keep abreast with all developments in these critical sectors. SOEs and the 
private sector can co-exist. Uganda should establish a strong corporate governance 
framework for its State Owned Enterprises. The unfortunate experience with some SOEs 
in Uganda has been attributed to poor corporate governance structures.  
 
NOCs remain relevant in many countries. They allow the government to keep watch over 
the oil industry given its importance to the GDPs of many oil exporting countries. NOCs 
also help oil exporting countries with insufficient regulatory capacity to regulate the 
industry. Though it has been noted that Uganda has a shaky history with regards to SOEs, 
this should not prevent the country from establishing a NOC to deal with the commercial 
aspects of its oil sector.  
 
There are several definitions of corporate governance. However, the research relied on 
the definitions which have a bearing on SOEs. The definition by Adrian Cadbury was 
found most relevant in this regard. Additionally, the stakeholder theory of corporate 
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governance has distinguished itself as the most relevant theory with regard to the 
corporate governance framework for SOEs. Corporate governance and public governance 
are quite inter-linked; they support each other. This is evident in Norway, as shown by 
the worldwide governance indicators. 
 
The OECD Principles and Guidelines on corporate governance are lauded as best practice 
for the establishment of a comprehensive corporate governance framework. They provide 
for corporate governance structures for SOEs, among others. Norway‘s corporate 
governance framework is to a large extent similar to the above-mentioned Principles and 
Guidelines. It has however been noted that the OECD Principles and Guidelines and the 
Norwegian corporate governance framework do not give sufficient coverage to 
stakeholders. 
 
The fact that Ugandan SOEs do not have a corporate governance framework makes it 
very difficult for the entities to perform optimally. There is need for corporate 
governance structures to insulate SOEs from unhealthy corporate practices and to prepare 
them for privatisation where necessary. The success of the proposed NOC greatly 
depends on steps being taken to provide corporate governance structures for SOEs in the 
Ugandan legal regime. 
 
It is apparent from the research that the Norwegian State Oil Company, due to the 
presence of good corporate governance structures, made substantial progress even before 
its partial privatization. Privatization has to an extent facilitated the continued expansion 
of the company. The merger with Hydro Oil and Gas in 2007 is one of the developments 
that have emerged after privatisation. This should not however sway the debate; the fact 
remains that the State Owned Enterprise was performing well even before privatisation. 
 
The presence of unique institutions in Norwegian corporate legislation, and the 
Norwegian State Oil Company have also contributed to the excellent management of the 
company. Institutions, such as, the corporate assembly, which supervises the board, and 
the nomination committee which helps the shareholders make credible decisions, 
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especially with regard to the selection of board members, reduce the burden of the board 
and the shareholders. These institutions should be introduced in Uganda; the non-
executive directors can play the role of the corporate assembly, while a new committee, 
the nomination committee, should be introduced in the Ugandan companies‘ legislation. 
 
As indicated above, the corporate governance structures in the Norwegian State Oil 
Company provide a very good example against which the corporate governance structure 
of the proposed NOC of Uganda can be modelled. This will greatly contribute to the 
efficient and profitable management of the proposed NOC of Uganda and minimize 
corruption. 
 
5.3 State Intervention, SOEs and NOCs: Broad Recommendations 
 
The discussion in chapter 2 indicates that SOEs in Uganda arose out of crisis and were, 
largely, never a result of deliberate economic policy. As indicated, this is especially true 
for the period between 1970 and 1979. In contrast, Norway presents a more organized 
system where SOEs and state intervention arose out of deliberate economic planning. 
This may be one of the reasons why SOEs in Norway have been successful. Against this 
background, it is proposed that a proper legal and institutional framework be created for 
SOEs in Uganda. This will competently deal with institutions like the NSSF and also 
provide a firm background for the establishment of the NOC in Uganda. 
 
Corporatisation, which appears to be the current trend for SOEs in Norway, is ideal for 
SOEs. This allows the SOEs to ably compete with the private sector. Corporatisation 
makes it easier to implement corporate governance in SOEs. Uganda is following the 
same trend and it has been proposed that the NOC of Uganda should be an incorporated 
entity. This trend should be implemented for all SOEs in Uganda. 
 
The chapter also demonstrates that NOCs have re-emerged despite the rampant 
privatisation of various NOCs that occurred in the 1980s. It has been noted that state 
participation has recently gained a stronghold. Uganda should not shy away from 
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establishing its NOC despite the shaky relationship it has had with SOEs in the past. This 
relationship can be improved through a strong corporate governance framework. The 
reasons cited for the re-emergence of NOCs are mainly based on the failure of market 
forces, the inconsistency of the international financial system, and the recent upsurge in 
oil and gas prices.  
 
The reasons advanced for the establishment of NOCs strongly indicate that state 
intervention is necessary in the management of the oil sector. Nevertheless, there are also 
reasons against the establishment of a NOC. This calls for a delicate balance in the 
establishment of the NOC as a purely state enterprise. It is recommended that the private 
sector be involved to some extent. Norway has recently partially privatized its NOC. This 
allows the private sector to get involved, and creates a nice balance between state 
intervention and private sector involvement. It also allows the NOC to keep its 
commercial objectives onboard. Private oil companies may also be involved, either as 
shareholders or through loose joint ventures with NOCs; this ensures that the commercial 
functions of the NOCs are not abandoned.  
 
5.4 Recommendations on Corporate Governance for SOEs in Uganda 
 
The stakeholder theory as opposed to the Agency and Stewardship theories, is best suited 
for the analysis of corporate governance in SOEs, This is because of its comprehensive 
approach in considering all stakeholders. Due to the nature of SOEs, the public has a 
keen interest in the way SOEs operate, irrespective of the fact that members of the public 
may not be direct shareholders but merely stakeholders. 
 
A correlation has been established between corporate governance and public governance. 
The concept of corporate governance is greatly influenced by public governance. Good 
public governance is a prerequisite for the establishment of a good corporate governance 
framework for SOEs and NOCs. The worldwide governance indicators show that Norway 
is performing quite well in terms of governance, as opposed to Uganda which still has to 
improve its public governance. The corporate governance framework in Norway is 
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founded on good public governance. Uganda has to improve its public governance; this 
will form a firm foundation for the proposed corporate governance framework for the 
SOE. 
 
The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance are a very good standard for establishing 
a good corporate governance framework. As discussed above, they have been 
recommended by several notable organisations, for example, the World Bank. They 
provide a good background for the development of a corporate governance regime. 
However the principles can further be improved by integrating stronger structures for the 
protection of stakeholders and not just shareholders. Uganda‘s corporate governance 
framework in the Companies Bill 2009 to some extent is in accordance with the OECD 
Principles on Corporate Governance, though it has not integrated the Guidelines for State 
Owned Enterprises.  
 
The OECD Guidelines for Corporate Governance in State Owned Enterprises are tailored 
to provide a model for the corporate governance regime of SOEs. The Guidelines provide 
a good model which ensures profitable management of an SOE. However, the Guidelines 
have some loopholes which require to be closed, such as, relations with stakeholders, 
transparency and disclosure. Similarly, Norway has established a corporate governance 
regime for SOEs. The Norwegian Principles are in very many ways similar to the OECD 
Guidelines, discussed above. The Norwegian Principles, just like the OECD Principles 
and Guidelines concentrate on shareholders as opposed to stakeholders, yet they deal 
with SOEs. There is a need to involve and cater for stakeholders‘ interests in policies 
related to SOEs. The Companies Bill 2009 and the Corporate Governance Code should 
be re-visited to provide for SOEs and to address the corporate governance needs of SOEs. 
The Ugandan Code is clearly not meant for SOEs. The Ugandan corporate governance 
regime should include corporate governance needs for SOEs; this can be done by 
including them in the Code or by drafting a corporate governance framework dedicated to 
SOEs. 
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5.5 Corporate Governance Structures in the Norwegian State Oil Company; 
Lessons for the Proposed NOC of Uganda  
 
The general meeting in Uganda, unlike in Norway, performs its duties independently. 
There is no corporate assembly, nor a nomination committee, to assist the shareholders, 
as is the case in Statoil and Norway generally. These institutions help shareholders make 
informed decisions. There is a need for the Companies Act to provide for a nomination 
committee, similar to the nomination committee in Norway, to assist shareholders 
especially in SOEs. The Companies Bill 2009 provides for a nomination committee, 
however, its mandate should be expanded and its role clearly outlined. 
 
The board of directors in Norway is supervised by the corporate assembly. This helps 
keep the board in check. The institution is quite relevant, but may be very expensive to 
establish in Uganda. In lieu of this body, the board of the proposed National Oil 
Company of Uganda should have a considerable number of competent non-executive 
directors, to create checks and balances and to monitor the board. The Companies Bill 
2009 and the Corporate Governance Code annexed thereto provide for executive and non 
-executive directors. The distinction should be maintained in the Companies Bill 2009. 
 
Unlike Norway, audit committees are not provided for in Uganda‘s Companies Act Cap 
110. However, the committees have been provided for in the Companies Bill 2009 and 
the Corporate Governance Code. The Companies Bill 2009 provides that every company 
should have at least an audit committee and a remuneration committee; these should be 
made up of mainly of non-executive directors. As discussed above, the audit committee is 
responsible for supervising the company auditors. It is proposed that the audit committees 
be established and that the audit committees of SOEs should liaise with the Office of the 
Auditor-General during the auditing process. 
 
As seen in Norway, corporate governance is central to the effective and profitable 
management of all corporations including SOEs. State intervention, SOEs and NOCs are 
relevant in the management of natural resources. The inefficiency and poor management 
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that have characterised SOEs can be cured by a strong corporate governance framework. 
The Petroleum Bill 2010 and the Companies Bill 2009 of Uganda do not provide a 
sufficient corporate governance framework for SOEs. This is bound to create inefficiency 
and corruption in the management of the oil sector in Uganda. A basic corporate 
governance structure for SOEs in Uganda and the proposed NOC of Uganda has been 
advanced in this study. A NOC with a strong corporate governance framework will 
generate revenue from the oil sector and foster development in Uganda. 
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